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ABSTRACT 
Already in the twelfth century, men canvassed different views on 
the ways in which they thought lordship ought to be exercised. They 
used their picture of how an idealised "Good Lord" -- a familiar label 
in later times -- comported himself to assess the treatment they 
actually received from their lords. This Good Lordship had both 
Positive and Negative aspects: the "good lord" maintained his vassals 
in their honours and renounced his right to revoke grants afterwards. 
One excellent \~ay to study the pursuit of this double ideal is through 
the language of charters, more particularly through the warranty 
clauses by which Good Lordship was often implemented. The 
transformation of warranty into its familiar Common-Law shape reflects 
corresponding and complex changes in both lord-vassal relations and the 
role of the King and his justice. 
Warranty actually began as a security device, designed to keep men 
to their word, and is found used in this sense over wide areas of sub-
Carolingisn Europe. It was probably imported to England by the French, 
and can be seen in twelfth-century charters progressively superseding 
other forms of words to become the classic "guarantee" of Good 
Lordship. In this manner it carne by 1200 to be virtually equated with 
the lordship it had originally been used to enforce. Warranty was 
lordship seen from the vassal's point of view, that is, tenant-right. 
Despite this origin in very personal relations, warranty probably 
always created between the parties' heirs some kind of obligation, 
which sharpened and was made infinitely more clear-cut with the 
emergence of full legal inheritance rights. Warranty swelled to full 
tenant-right, 8 full guarantee of the Right to Good Lordship. 
As the h,eir's claim grew into an enforceable right of inheritance 
through increasing access to remedies by royal justice, and because 
such justice tended to strict construction, warranty became a 
contractual addition to which claimants had to prove their entitlement. 
The narrative of legal change from 1150 argues for gradual evolution 
but also suggests 1153-4 8S the decisive turning-point in this 
development. 
Detailed (sometimes technical) examination of evidence for some 
relevant cases, royal writs concerning warranty and the turning-point 
of 1153-4 is reserved for three appendixes. 
WARRANTY AND GOOD LORDSHIP IN TWELFTH-CENTURY ENGLAND* 
This paper starts from charters. It may even be regarded as an 
attempt to trace and explain the rise and development of express 
warranty clauses in English private documents, an exercise in 
diplomatic. The main stimulus behind the investigation is, however, 
something quite different: the challenge of understanding English law 
before the advent of a Common Law. I want my explanations to be 
consistent not merely with the social relations that produced the 
charters, but also with the mental terms in which they were thought out 
and interpreted, their legal context. 
Charters have some particular merits for the legal historian of 
the twelfth century. The sheer volume of twelfth-century charters 
offers perhaps the best chance to explore the world from which the 
Common Law emerged. They also serve as a useful check to the official 
Common-Law records, because they offer a view of normality before the 
onset of conflict and litigation and from the perspective of the future 
litigant and his advisers. Additionally, the legal historian can 
attempt through charters to surmount one of his most acute difficulties 
-- habitual ignorance about his subjects' life before the case and 
outside the court-room. And starting from one of the well-edited 
collections immeasurably increases his chances of success. l 
For these reasons, I have chosen to work here in the first 
instance from the four thousand or so charters from twelfth- and early 
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thirteenth-century Yorkshire already in pr into 2 There is, of course, at 
least one obvious objection to this procedure: that for all its 
apparent bulk the sample is still too small and localised. Most readers 
will take some convincing that even Yorkshire can represent all of 
England; this exiled Yorkshireman glories in his native shire's blessed 
atypicality. But legal historians have perhaps been too fearful of the 
supposed abysses between customary practices on the different twelfth-
century lordships. The major principles on procedure, family and 
lordship appear to have been more widely shared than used to be 
thought, less variable by region and fief. 3 In any event, the lordships 
represented in "Early Yorkshire Charters" extend a good distance beyond 
the county boundaries and into a fair range of conditions and terrain. 
From them, I hope to propose hypotheses of national pretensions for 
test against hard fact from other areas. A dialectic between local fact 
and national legal analysis is sorely needed. 
1. Warranty's pual Origin 
Most accounts present warranty as a very technical legal 
institution, of interest mainly to historians of common-law doctrine 
and procedure. The textbooks tend to class it as an institution of 
public royal law, essentially a subsidiary, if important, function of 
lordship over land. Scholars often portray Common-law warranty as 
intrinsically bound up with the possession of charters and the courts' 
close interpretation of their formulas. Since the time of the great 
Maitland, work on the real actions based On premises such as these has 
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made a solid contribution to our understanding of the developed common 
law of land. More recent studies have, however, exposed the older 
view's difficulties in explaining a number of the features of the very 
early common law. 4 It is now axiomatic that a proper understanding of 
early warranty -- and thus its development into the institution of the 
plea rolls and yearbooks -- can only come from focussing first on its 
function and appearance in the twelfth century. 
In attempting something of this kind, the spotlight almost 
inevitably falls On Prof. S.F.C. Milsom's wonderfully creative book, 
The Legal Framework of English Feudalism,5 which blazed a trail largely 
followed here. The central role of warranty in that book's schema, not 
immediately obvious to the casual reader, is well worth further 
emphasis. Milsom sets out a very clear view of the essential character 
of that earlier world from which the common law was created: it was 
dominated by lordship. This liberating insight, which has much advanced 
our understanding of the common law's birth -- not to mention other 
aspects of Angevin society and politics -- naturally still needs 
critical consideration. There is much more than private lordship to the 
social relations of twelfth-century England. To appreciate the proper 
interaction between warranty and lordship, in particular, requires some 
clarification of concepts and origins. 
Somewhere very close to warranty lies the age-old duty of '~ood 
lordship,~6 A man owes a duty to support and protect in their material 
honour the vassals on whose support he depends. This Good Lordship is 
patently an ideal, a standard against which men measure actual 
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practic& In violent times, men exercised lordship in ways that seemed 
hardly to recognise vassals' rights at all, or indeed trod them 
consciously underfoot. Still, most men accepted that vassals did have 
some rights; by this date confusion of honourable vassals with servile 
dependants was unacceptable. Arguably, the historian wishing to 
attribute "ownership" of land in anything resembling the modern 
lawyer's sense needs to assess the rough balance of power between lord 
and man with care. As this shifted according to political circumstance, 
so too in a sense did "ownership". One might thus talk of vassal's 
"rights" as the reverse side of the lord~ duty to his man, a kind of 
equivalent to the much better documented rights of lordship.7 
One way to trace contemporary dealings with these theoretical 
rights of honourable dependants and tenants is through the language of 
warranty. Significantly, this appears over a broad area of northern 
Europe (not just England) as an import, not initially associated with 
lordship. Warranty was in origin a security device, semantically as 
well as etymologically akin to a modern guarantee. Yet, already before 
the end of the twelfth century warranty was almost universally used as 
the standard English method of portraying tenant-right (Latin ius, 
French dreit). Effect ively, it represented lordship, v iewed from the 
perspective of the vassal as tenant. Sometimes, indeed, warranty is 
apparently equated with homage, the bond which tied the vassal to his 
lord and the ritual which made that bond visible. 
A further point is helpful in clarifying the way land-lordship 
worked. The warranty of early land law has a dual nature. In his 
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warranty, the grantor made two rather different commitments. He made, 
first, a positive promise, that he (and his family) would maintain the 
grant against outside challenge. They would warrant their grantee's 
right against third parties and (probably) acquit him against anyone 
who tried to claim from him service other than that provided for in the 
original grant. If they were unable to do this, the grantee had to be 
compensated for his loss, as by an exchange ("escambium") of an 
equivalent holding. Developed warranty additionally had a negative 
aspect, by which the grantor was understood to have renounced his right 
to second thoughts. Once the grant waS complete, neither he (nor his 
family) were to try to resume any part of the property conveyed. 8 
These negative and positive aspects of warranty are pretty 
obviously severable. It is not certain that the negative aspect was 
originally thought of as inherent in warranty. Charters with express 
warranty clauses sometimes contain separate renunciation clauses. A 
thirteenth-century defendant would not defend a claim by his own 
grantor or some descendant by direct reliance on the original warranty; 
he would plead that his opponent was bound to warrant him when he was 
impleaded by a third party and could therefore not succeed against him. 
Clearly, there is no intrinsic necessity to pursue the rather different 
ends of the positive and negative aspects of warranty by means of a 
single institution. 9 
Examination of the general relation between warranty and 
lordship is patently a first task. Initially, there seems much to be 
said for the formulation of warranty as the obligations of the land-
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lord seen from the tenant's point of view. But although the hypothesis 
accords well with a good deal of twelfth-century customary practice. 
the identity with lordship is incomplete. IO Certain features of late 
twelfth-century law. incompatible with it. point towards a rather 
different view of warranty's origins and significance. 
Take first the extant land charters. As we should expect. we find 
warranty reserved in at least some of the rare early lay charters of 
enfeoffment. grants where one layman became another's lord -- we might 
say. landlord ._- for the holding conveyed. do include express warranty 
clauses. 11 Grants in substitution. where the grantee is to hold not 
of his grantor but of his overlord (grants that is. where the grantor 
relinquished any claims to lordship over the land or its new tenant) 
ought conversely to contain no warranty clauses. This is a good test. 
Twelfth-century grants of this kind are somewhat more common than once 
thought I2 and seldom made casually or without proper consideration. I 
have in fact noticed no such early grants with an express warranty 
clause,!3 One does. however. occasionally find the inclusion of a 
warranty in confirmations by the grantor's lord (i.e. the new tenant's 
overlord). The new tenant. usually a religious house. obviously 
thought he was getting something worthwhile out of this. something that 
would otherwise not be his. No doubt the warranty of a powerful lord 
was preferable to that of his more obscure tenant. 14 
Grants in alms to the Church tell a subtly different tale. 
largely but not completely in accord with the logic of the lordship 
view. The documents recording these were usually composed on behalf of 
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the beneficiaries. One of their draftsmen's main aims was to combine 
security for the property rights conveyed to their house with the 
fullest possible Gregorian liberties against possible secular 
interference and obligations. Elemosina was to be free and pure, as 
well as perpetual. Twelfth-century charters omitted to mention a 
tenurial bond between the parties to grants in alms much more 
frequently than in grants in fee. The church holding in alms was not 
stated to hold of anyone. This cannot be mere chance. Clerical 
draftsmen were no doubt happy to minimise a grantor's continuing 
residual control over his former land, and perhaps to imply that no 
tenure existed between the parties. Logically, one would not expect a 
warranty clause in such charters; no tenure, no warranty. In practice 
there sometimes was one, to emphasize the grantor's continuing 
obligation. IS This was the Church having its cake and eating it too. 
The grantor was expected to fulfill his duties without enjoying the 
fruits of lordship. The monks expected warranty from one whom they 
would not acknowledge as lord. 
This widespread pattern does not support the correlation between 
tenure and warranty to be expected if warranty were merely a function 
of lordship. Certain other aspects of early warranty law likewise ring 
warning bells about any simple theory of the connection between 
warranty and lordship. Even in the 1180s, the writs available for 
voucher to warranty in the course of an action of right do not appear 
to be limited to use against lords and the unique role of warranty 
within dower claims is quite impossible to square with a lordship view. 16 
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Even in the later twelfth century, warranty and associated terms 
retained a range of meanings. They were still almost as much used of 
chattels as of land and in ways that have no reference at all to 
lordship. Twelfth-century Englishmen hearing the word "warranty" 
probably thought as readily of chattels lost or stolen as of lan~ 
Cons ider G lanv ill's trea t ise of the la te 1180s. I ts author's trea tment 
of chattel warranty in his Book X on debts cross-references his 
discussion of land warranty only because, in his view, the same 
procedure applJLed to both kinds of property.17 Warranty -- the plea 
that some third party sold or gave you the disputed property -- is 
clearly a normal defence to theft accusations. Someone found in 
possession of stolen goods can plead that he acquired them properly in 
open market and then summon (vouch) his source to come into court, 
confirm the story and take over the onus of explaining where the goods 
came from. 
Slightly later cases help to flesh out Glanvill's account of the 
procedure. i8 Chattel warranty was in no way derived from, or 
subsidiary to, the warranty of land grants. It is a very ancient 
procedure, illustrated in England by the tenth century enactments that 
had tried to confine legitimate trade to nominated places where they 
could be properly witnesse~ Ideally these official witnesses rendered 
unnecessary the use of warranty in cases of, say, livestock rustling. 
In practice thieves who escaped immediate death must often have been 
allowed to put off the moment of judgement by vouching a warrantor who 
might, in his turn, vouch someone else. That the tenth-century system 
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continued, at least theoretically, into the twelfth century is shown by 
contemporary unofficial leges and latin translations of Old English 
laws. 19 Similarly, perhaps by analogy, one finds reference to warranty 
as a defence to other criminal-type accusations. 20 
The clear conclusion from all this is that the device of warranty 
was applicable to both goods and land. A little extra confirmation 
comes from a slightly unexpected source. Andrew of St. Victor was a 
distinguished expositor of the literal sense of the Bible. An 
Englishman by birth, he taught in the French schools before returning 
to end his days as abbot of Wigmore on the Welsh border. He was 
reminded of warranty when commenting on a verse of Isaiah, I~ord, I 
suffer violence, answer thou for me~ This, he said, was the 
equivalent of the French: '~ord reclaim me, warrant (garantiza) me~ 
"When our belongings [Andrew's word "res" would cover either land or 
chattels] have been taken from ns by theft", he went on, "or lost in 
any way, and we find them in the possession of others, we vindicate 
them as our own and, so to speak, put in our claim. But if those 
against whom we claim have bought or in some other way received the 
goods from others, these latter must stand for the possessors and 
warrant what they sold or granted. Lord, vindicate and reclaim me, 
your servant, whom sickness and death have almost abducted, guard and 
protect me as your own possession".21 
Since the word '~arantus" and its equivalents are extensively 
used in these texts, the occasional charter promise to warrant a 
chattel grant is unsurprising. 22 In truth, the range of situations in 
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which warranty language was used far beyond landed property almost 
deserves a separate study. The appropriate translation of warranty 
words vary according to context. The connotation can be "surety" or 
"witness",23 though "guarantor" in something like the non-technical 
modern sense is usually defensible. Most usage seems, moreover, to 
share a tripartite conceptual core: The guarantor is required to take 
over responsibility for a disputed action or claim from a defendant 
who, in some sense, acted on his behalf or under his authority.24 He 
becomes responsible for defence of the case, once his obligation to 
warrant is established. And finally, his competence or duty to warrant 
might be impl i<ed from the circumstances; the warranty did not have to 
be expressly made. A crooked horsedealer could not, for example, plead 
that he did not have to warrant an alleged thief, on the ground that he 
had never expressly promised that the horse was his at the time of the 
sale! Patently, lordship is in no way essential to chattel warranty; 
buying a horse did not make you the dealer's vassal! 
The wide usage of warranty language thus presents a minor 
puzzle for solutio~ We have seen that warranty of land was very 
closely tied up with lordship in the later twelfth century and there 
will be more to say of warranty as tenant-right. Yet, the idea of 
warranty itself was pretty obviously used in many contexts where 
lordship had no place. The dating and nature of these non-seignorial 
uses rule out the possibility of mere analogy with land warrant~25 
Furthermore, the difficulty is not a purely English one, for it extends 
over much of w<estern Europe and beyond, wherever the language of 
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warranty was spoken. The hypothesis to meet this international problem 
needs itself to be international. 
In origin, warranty seems to have had nothing to do with either 
lordship or land as such. It was simply one of a number of forms of 
personal engagement by which the men of the West sought to keep each 
other honest through the difficult period of the decline and break-up 
of the Carolingian Empire. 26 Commitments in warranty language can be 
found from a broad area of Northern and Western France and beyond. They 
are not confined to landed property, and the usage may well have begun 
in I ivestock markets. 
Certainly, these theft procedures involving warranty were widely 
known and practised in eleventh-century Europe and by no means new at 
that time. Anyone caught in possession of allegedly stolen goods could 
escape responsibility by showing that he came by them properly and in 
open market. Ideally, he named his source, who then had to answer the 
allegations in his place. This plea, if confirmed, was in principle a 
complete defence for the original accused. The seller now replaced him 
and might perhaps in turn have his source summoned as warrantor. 
Naturally, fear of the hangman's noose created some competition to pass 
on others the onus of facing the accusation. There was often argument 
(even battle) between the party saddled with possession and the person 
from whom he said it came (his vouchee to warranty). The need to 
resolve this before the principal charge could be tried could cause 
considerable delay. 
The warranty here is the personal obligation of a donor to 
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confirm his donee's story and thus to guarantee his title. Its 
consequences closely resemble those familiar from later land law, 
except that absolutely no questions of lordship arose from it. The 
personal relationship behind chattel warranty could be very temporary 
and quite comlnercial in nature, lasting perhaps for no longer than it 
takes two horse-traders to agree the price of an animal at market. 
From the eleventh century (and earlier), this pattern of 
warranty for the sale of goods coexisted over much of Europe with 
warranty of lan~27 If chattel warranty came first, as seems possible, 
it may have been laymen who first noticed the possible analogy with 
land. Early written references on the Continent sometimes contain 
disclaimers of such non-classical usage as '~t vulgo dicitur,~28 
Perhaps some lay lord suggested its inclusion in a charter recording 
his grant of land. Or perhaps some enterprising monastic draftsman, 
concerned to secure for his house the continuing protection of their 
benefactor. included a warranty clause in a land charter on his own 
initiative. 1ben, personal submissions of the impotent to powerful 
protectors might have been a decisive factor in warranty's spread. 
Certainly, lords interposed into the chain of land title in this way 
became the characteristic warrantors of land title. 
How far this kind of pattern holds for England is obscure. We 
cannot even be sure whether Anglo-Saxon England knew land as well as 
chattel warranty, and the cautious will probably consider land warranty 
another Norman innovation from France. 29 This can only be speculation. 
More important here is the undoubted fact that, since warranty of both 
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kinds of property continued into Angevin England, warranty of land must 
be interpreted within a lexicographic context that includes the chattel 
procedures inherited from the Anglo-saxon past. The undoubtedly 
seignorial nature of Angevin land warranty as tenant-right must be a 
function not of warranty's seignorial origins -- because it did not 
have any 
over land. 
but of a temporary equation of lordship with protection 
The protective lordship of the early twelfth century is not easily 
documented, even where land was part of the transaction. At this stage, 
grants to laymen were rarely written down. Instead, those involved 
proclaimed the changed status and property relations to the community 
at large by public ritual acts. The Homage ceremony broadcast the 
status gulf between a new lord and his man, through a submission ritual 
(complete with kiss as well as oath) that should instantly strike a 
chord even among ethologists. And Livery of Seisin, as is well known, 
was intended to ensure that any accompanying land grant was completed 
in a physical act of transferring the right to the land or its 
enjoyment through some symbol so visible that future denial waS out of 
the question.3D Spectators who viewed these two ceremonies knew from 
their experience of similar acts in the past how to interpret what 
transpired. We can perhaps say they ''knew'' their custom. Their memory 
primed not only on possession but also about customary right and status 
relations, they stood ready to bear witness by oath or sword, should 
this be required. 
It is little exaggeration to see the charters' main function at 
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this stage as assisting individual memories of an important occasion in 
the past. Most interestingly, the two rituals just mentioned carried 
for the vassal-tenant precisely the same meanings as the positive and 
negative functions of warranty. He performed his homage in the hope 
that it would commit his lord to behave towards him as a Good Lord 
should. to protect him and his honour. Similarly, in his eyes the point 
of Livery of Seisin was to dramatize his acquisition of seisin and thus 
prevent the grantor and his friends from denying the transfer later. 
The temptation to regard this equation as confirmation of the 
separate origins of what I termed the positive and negative aspects of 
warranty is to be resisted. The rituals of homage and livery of seisin 
were almost certainly less distinct from each other than is usually 
supposed. Our accounts of each are of the kind that impose on messy 
real-life happenings a neatness and order they never actually 
possessed. Any close reading of the charters shows, for example, that 
these '~ccasions" frequently included other ritual acts such as the 
public enunciation of a warranty promise combined with an affidatio or 
oath on some holy object.31 In real life, homage and livery of seisin 
must once have shaded into each other in ways that depended on what was 
most central at: the time. Perhaps only where a new lordship relation 
was being created without any land grant -- an infrequent event outside 
exceptional situations like that after the murder of the Count of 
Flanders in 1127 -- did the ceremonial approximate to textbook homage. 
In the much mo:re likely event of a land grant to an already-established 
vassal. proceedings will have resembled ''Livery of Seisin" more 
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closely, but seldom exactly. And where lordship was created alongside 
or through a land grant, the ceremonial was, no doubt, messier still 
and hard to analyse in the terms to which we have become used. 
This is not the place to pursue such a suggestion. To the man 
hungry for the security of Good Lordship the precise theory that 
underlay his protective relationships was much less important than the 
fact of protection. Since Good Lordship itself is the object of our 
inquiry, we must confine ourselves to warranty and kindred formulas, 
such as the direct promises of Maintenance or Protection that were 
sometimes patently central to the documents that contain them. Most 
examples are found in lords' confirmations, naturally enough since the 
ability to protect vassals was basic to Good Lordship. This 
willingness to act on behalf of a threatened tenant is at the core of 
what I have called the positive aspect of warranty. 
Historically, offers of protection, loaded or otherwise, were 
the roots from which such lordship sprang, its very justification.32 
In the circumstances of early medieval Europe, no pauper could stand 
alone against pressure or threats of violence from a neighbouring 
potens.33 Vulnerability rather than penury defined the so-called 
~. In time of trouhle, men naturally turned to their lord for 
ai~ Even in the twelfth century, the duty to protect one's vassals 
was still recognised as basic to good lordship. Nor was the expected 
assistance merely a matter of help with the expenses or organisation of 
presenting a case in court. Particularly during the difficult years of 
Stephen's reign outbreaks of good old-fashioned violence required from 
16 
a "good" lord equally old-fashioned physical aid. The awkward 
corollary, that petty freeholders and minor gentry were swept up in the 
feuds and social competition of the very great, can be documented from 
the plea rolls of the early thirteenth century as well as from more 
expected places. 3 4 
Twelfth century charters, for all the special ecclesiastical 
interests of the draftsmen mostly responsible for them, permit us to 
put some flesh on the bare bones of lordship theor~ We read of estate 
officials ordered to treat named lands exactly as they would the lord's 
own demesne35 and vassals warned not to harass their lord's new 
tenants.36 Rather more politely, charter grantors request their amici 
to do what they can on behalf of dependants in need. 37 Through the 
learned formulas waft echoes of earthier lay feelings about lordship. 
''He who makes trouble here is no friend of mine", Roger de Mowbray is 
made to say on one occasion; on another, he admonishes all his men to 
guard and maintain the possessions of St. Peter's Hospital in his fee, 
or his steward will compel them to do so, "as he loves me and the 
salvation of my soul~38 It seems that the ancient ideal of the loyal 
vassal sworn t.o love those whom his lord loved and hate those whom he 
hated still retained some force,39 despite the evidence that protection 
was sometimes forced down the unwilling gullets of the weak or peddled 
for profit. 40 
The charters also document some of the mechanisms of seignorial 
protection. Two in particular, maintenance and advowry, enrich our 
understanding of warranty. Twelfth century charters very frequently 
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make their grantors promise to maintain the beneficiaries, generally 
religious houses, on the lands granted. 41 As the century wore on, the 
language of maintenance is increasingly incorporated into express 
warranty clauses. 42 The original promise was again one of physical 
support in the kind of world where courts and royal interference were 
largely discounted. This assumption was riskier in England, where 
lords always had to reckon with kings and courts, than in France (which 
is, of course, where the trail once again leads). The English 
situation was most nearly comparable during the reign of Stephen. 
Three charters from this period, all concerned with the same grant 
in free alms to Nostell, make an excellent illustration. The 
benefactor, Osbert Salve in, sheriff of Nottingham and Derby in 1130 and 
the man of several great lords for fees elsewhere must be presumed to 
have known what he was doing. He took the trouble to notify and beg 
("precor") for his grant the help of several of his most influential 
contacts, in terms appropriate to eac~ One charter addressed to his 
'~earest lord" Adam Tison reassured his immediate landlord that he 
stood to suffer no loss but would on the contrary benefit from the 
monks' special prayers, and asked him to confirm Osbert's gift. In a 
second charter, Osbert requested King Stephen himself, "his lord" Roger 
de Mowbray (the tenant-in-chief for the Tison fee) and "his lord" Adam 
again, along with all his amici and kinsmen, to confirm and maintain 
the donation in the event that anyone decided out of perversity to 
molest the monks. And a third document notifying the Dean and Chapter 
of York of the grant, recited Osbert's unchallenged tenure this time in 
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the canonical terms of a thirty- year period, then implored all sons of 
Holy Church as well as his own heirs and successors to maintain and 
keep these his alms for the love of God and the honour of Holy 
Church. 43 Osbert must in his time have received and dealt with many 
royal writs, including not a few initiating litigation. Yet he 
included no mention of legal action in his attempts to provide a 
comprehensive safeguard for his relatively minor gift. The absence of 
any straight charter of gift among the documents is perhaps itself more 
than chance. Osbert knew that in the event of future challenge, the 
maintenance of great men was all-important, since, in Maitland's dry 
words, "such an answer would often be final".44 
Maintenance as revealed by the charters makes in at least two 
respects an instructive contrast with warranty. It was in one sense 
wider ranging. A grantor could call upon whomever he liked. He was not 
restricted to his heirs or successors in title. Apart from his own 
officials, he might include virtually anyone whom he felt he could 
influence, even the king himself. For what it was worth, he could call 
on everyone aware of his grant, as in the standard charter address 
clauses. The effect of this remains obscure. Maintenance language 
retained much of the feeling of a voluntary gesture, lord to man, 
unenforceable except by pressure of honour and shame. The commitments 
recorded by the charters created no legal obligation. There is no hint 
that failure to perform carried with it any right of the beneficiary to 
claim compensation. Grantors merely expressed the hope that those they 
addressed would do what they could to help.45 The author of the Leges 
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Henrici Primi warned in the second decade of the century that failure 
to perform could result in the lord's loss or dishonour. 46 He clearly 
believed that lords ought to support their men through their own courts 
if they had them, or wherever they could. But not even he mentions any 
right of the vassal to enforce maintenance by suing in some court. In 
contrast, warranty came to be all about such suits. 
In the absence of legal enforcement, a promise of maintenance 
was only as persuasive as its promisor's physical and political clout 
could make it. It may have been most valuable in connection with the 
procedure of compurgation, still in active use well into the twelfth 
century, where the need for oath-helpers virtually forced litigants 
into the arms of the local powers-that-be. Maintenance was perhaps an 
attempt to secure those oaths in advance against some future emergency. 
It offered the impotent no more than a hope of binding the powerful. 
Neither a poor man nor a religious house could realistically hope to 
sue if the great chose not to honour their engagements. Who would they 
find to appear in their support? Maintenance had to be a matter of 
persuasion and social relationship. 
It was also just one of the various ways of describing 
protective lordship. Another was advowry, whose effect on warranty 
language in cases from the earliest plea rolls was demonstrated some 
years ago by Prof. Bailey. He remarked upon the unusual terms used to 
record voucher to warranty in cases about churches. The clerical 
incumbent of a church sued by a would-be patron did not vouch 
("vocavit") a warrantor, as a secular defendant would; he avocavit the 
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patron who had presented him to the benefice. 47 In other words he 
subordinated his own interest in the church to that of his patron, the 
advocatus who sometimes still in the later twelfth century thought of 
himself as its lord and owner. 48 The pattern of patronage and 
protection in these twilight days of the proprietary church may be 
expected to bear some resemblance to that formerly prevalent around 
secular property at a date when lords could be represented as owners of 
their tenants' holdings under the same label advocatio (advowry, 
avowry).49 
Some such conclusion seems likely to hold for Normandy towards 
1100, despite the extreme rarity there of the classical sub-carolingian 
monastic advocate. In a situation where the dukes enjoyed a virtual 
monopoly of monastic advocacy, charter references to advocates implied 
an obligation on those so named to protect the whole estate of the 
beneficiar~ Norman warranty can thus be seen as advowry made specific 
to a particular grant. 50 Perhaps the same was true in England. 
Outside the royal courts, men may have occasionally "avowed" to hold 
land of a lord, in rather the way the plea rolls show them avowing 
tenure of churches. 51 In the twelfth-century Latin leges, "advocatio" 
denoted the kind of protection to be looked for first from one's kin or 
lord, but which the king was expected to provide for the defenceless 
pauperes.52 Legal translators on occasion used "advocatus" as the 
equivalent of French "warans,,53 and charters too seem to equate the 
"advocatus" with the warrantor.5 4 It seems likely that the patterns of 
seignorial protection known as advowry in outlying areas had once been 
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more general. What prevented advowry rather than warranty from 
becoming the accepted term for the lord's obligation to maintain his 
tenants on what was once '~is" land was probably its preemption by the 
church for its own. 55 
2. Good Lordship defined in idea and actuality 
We are some distance now towards an understanding of the way 
warranty came to represent the obligations of land-lordship in the 
early common law. The positive aspects of warranty must be seen within 
the context of the kind of competitive lordship whose respectability 
the Angevin reforms effectively removed. By that time, charter 
draftsmen had few doubts about the best way to make explicit on behalf 
of land grantees the good lordship to which their tenure entitled them. 
The language they employed had a long history stretching back across 
the Channel into the French homelands of England's conquerors. From 
the end of the twelfth century, although alternative formulas remained 
known, warranty clauses predominated, as the neatest way to combine 
positive protection with the ever essential renunciation of claims by 
the grantor and his heirs. 56 
What did warranty guarantee to the tenant? Unless the grantor said 
otherwise, he gave his tenant whatever right he had in the land, less a 
lordship that customarily included the expectation of service. The 
tenant received full right against the world as far as his landlord 
could guarantee it. 57 This was as close to full right as a lay tenant 
could hope to approach before the Angevin reforms. 58 By Glanvill's 
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time, then, warranty did approximate to tenant-right ("ius"). 
The best way to see this is to consider briefly the early disputes 
over warranty (or homage) in the king's courts. Would-be tenants 
sought to persuade the king to enforce their claims to warranty (or 
homage) against an opponent who perhaps preferred to hold in demesne. 59 
The real issue here was title to land. Hence pleading was in the 
right; when matters of seisin were adduced, it was to establish right. 
The suits by royal writ for warranty or homage were in effect an 
alternative to that upward claim of right which Prof. Milsom has 
identified as the "prime case covered by the writ patent".60 They were 
used in some of the circumstances where that writ, the Breve de Recto 
patent, was ineffective or unavailable.61 
In the classic situation, where the tenant was already being sued 
in a royal court for his holding, it was obviously too late for him to 
bring an original writ of right against his lord. He ought nevertheless 
to have some way to claim right against his lord, to persuade the king 
to enforce his claim to warranty or the receipt of his homage. The 
warranty issue only arose where right was at stake. Thus a lessee, 
lacking the special security which comes from doing homage, could 
expect no implied warranty from the early common law. His lessor 
retained full legal seisin during the lease. For connected reasons, in 
the highly possessory assize of novel disseisin with its summary 
procedure, voucher to warranty was restricted in a fashion unique among 
contemporary land actions. Yet it was available as normal in the 
related assize of mort d'ancestor which came much closer to the 
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right.62 The warranty promise summed up the tenant's legitimate 
expectations that his land-lord will guarantee and protect him in his 
title and tenur~ It guaranteed his righL 
The obligation to warrant one's grant in this way was certainly 
not new in the last years of the twelfth century. This is not to deny 
the transformations of tenant-right effected by the recent law reforms. 
Previously, warranty can only have secured to tenants such right in 
their holding as custom and their lords permitted them. It is not hard 
to believe in the previous existence of a sentiment that the trusted 
vassal with full military tenure, at least. ought to rest secure in the 
knowledge that his lord would warrant him against any outsider, 
whatever the terms of his tenure, and irrespective of any difficulties 
in establishing those terms.63 This would carry the important 
corollary that such tenants already possessed a certain form of 
property right.64 Can one go further to assert that the grantor of a 
permanent tenure was expected to warrant, unless he had for some reason 
specifically excluded warranty?65 Can one perhaps infer a general duty 
to warrant all tenants in fee from the mere existence of a grant? And 
if so, how long had this existed? 
An hypothesis of this kind is very hard to test. The practice 
of recording lay grants by charter only began to be routine at the end 
of the twelfth century; most previous lay land dispositions had been 
essentially oral. The commonplace formulas of thousands of charters 
from which one can deduce the routine of lay land dealings in the 
thirteenth century do not exist for the twelfth. Early charters about 
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lay grants are always likely to have been produced precisely to record 
the exceptional. Thus the ordinary case, where a general obligation to 
warrant might show up, is irrevocably lost to us, and charter testimony 
on this kind of point must always be a little suspect. Among the very 
rare charter statements of general custom,66 none seems to deal with 
warranty. 
We are reduced to searching the extant charters for data in 
conflict with our suggested picture of normality, a most unsatisfactory 
mode of proceeding. The most obvious fact about extant twelfth-century 
charters is the preponderance of grants to religion. The fact that the 
spread of express clauses of warranty thus begins in an ecclesiastical 
context inevitably raises the suspicion that the warranty obligation 
might have been an ecclesiastical innovation designed to protect 
benefactions. Suggestions that some drafting device was imported for 
lay transactions from the province of learned churchmen must always be 
taken seriousl~67 On this occasion, however, the origins are lay, not 
learned. 
The best way to see this is to ask what happened when documents 
about a grant were either lacking or offered no explicit guidance. The 
developed common law included an often complex doctrine of implied 
warranty, to specify the occasions when it would intervene to enforce a 
claimant's rights. Some of the early common law's most obviously 
technical judgements68 were devoted to this subject. This was only to 
be expected, as part of the all-important process of determining the 
limits of tenurial protection. Perhaps the most striking feature of 
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the doctrine of implied warranty in Glanvill and the earliest plea 
rolls is its breadth, the range of cases it covere~69 Clearly, men 
already expected to have to warrant grants without their vouchors 
necessarily producing charters and binding warranty clauses, often 
without any written evidence at all. Moreover, the Church could not 
have exercised any substantial influence on the warranty obligation, 
without giving land warranty quite a different meaning from that which 
warranty carried in the context of chattel dealings, where written 
guarantees were superfluous.70 The fact that the one institution of 
warranty could cover such a range of transactions much strengthens the 
case for its being a general obligation on all grantors. 
More direct evidence in support of the proposition is not 
entirely lacking, though interpretable in more than wa~ There is no 
doubt that warranty obligations predated the rise of express clauses in 
England. Scattered evidence from the eleventh century exists for a 
wide area of Continental Europe; it was a common if not standard 
feature in Normandy by c.llOO, and probably in Anjou, Maine and 
Touraine too. 71 Express warranty clauses, though increasingly rare as 
one goes back in time, can certainly be found in England before the 
1170s.72 Direct charter reference to the tenant's right to an exchange 
on failure of the warranty comes some decades earlier.73 These dates 
depend on chance survival and the draftsman's whim. As if to emphasize 
this, the first clauses to exclude exchange, specifying that the 
grantor accepted no obligation in the event that he was unable to 
warrant his grant, begin earlier still. St. Mary's, York issued 
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charters with just such an exclusion clause as early as the latter part 
of Henry 1's reign, almost as soon as grants recognisably akin to the 
later grants in fee begin to appear. 74 One can surely take it that 
when draftsmen take the trouble to exclude expressly a possible 
corollary, the existence of the primary obligation is so clear as not 
to require explicit mention. 
Recent work on Normandy appears to establish that the same kind of 
customary exp,ectations of good lordship already existed deep into the 
eleventh centllry.7 5 Since a comparable examination of the eleventh-
century English evidence is far beyond the scope of the present paper, 
we must be content to survey the Norman arguments and indicate how far 
their conclusions are likely to be applicable on the other side of the 
Channel. Normans patently counted on their lord's aid when it was 
necessary, in the courtroom just as much as on the field of battle. If 
it failed to materialize, they felt wronged.7 6 Nor were their 
expectations restricted to themselves. They assumed too that the claims 
of vassals' sons to enjoy a similar lordship should be implemented in 
the absence of good reason. 
What the son had was, of course, no more than a claim, which 
naturally lost its force when his family sided with the lord's enemies 
or acted in some other fashion that forfeited the right to grace. 
Someone else might possess a stronger claim, a possibility that will 
receive further consideration below. 77 When a man's legitimate claim 
was defeated by greater right, however, his peers generally agreed that 
he ought to receive compensatio~ The language is voluntary, the future 
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tense rather than imperatives, but the drift is clear. Gradually 
charter expressions of the aspiration for the protection of Good 
Lordship become more confident and swell into a virtual customary 
tenant-right. Though the process is neither in any sense inevitable nor 
even in its pace and strength, hereditary claims grew more powerful by 
degrees. 
The sensible vassal took nothing for granted. He adopted what 
safeguards he could. Increasingly this meant an express commitment in 
writing, especially in cases where there had already been some dispute. 
(References to previous disputes are prominent among the earliest 
formulas. Once bitten twice shy!) Already by the first years of the 
twelfth century Normandy had reached the stage where the clear trend 
was towards more explicit statements of obligation. Between 1101 and 
1106, for example, the Abbot of Preaux, propelled by his vassals into a 
grant against his better judgement, explicitly refused any commitment 
to his new tenant to make an exchange if the present grant failed for 
any reason. 78 
The holders of "Cross-Channel Estates" might be expected to behave 
the same way in all their lands. From the middle years of Henry I's 
reign onwards, this was demonstrably so. In England as in Normandy, the 
good lord was routinely expected to warrant his man's tenure. 79 Henry 
I's Coronation Charter of 1100. that paean to Good Lordship, strongly 
suggests that the same expectation already existed before the turn of 
the century. Confirmation comes from the complex evidence of the 
Domesday Inquest. 
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In 1086, the primary test for disputed title was the testimony of 
local jurors, men of shire or hundred. They were supposed to indicate 
from their own knowledge the person through whom a tenant had 
entered. 80 Mostly this depended on royal acts; the jurors either had 
or had not seen someone seised by the king's writ and man (liberator). 
This has very much the air of a public guarantee of title. 81 On 
occasion, though, this public livery of seisin was attributed to a 
private lord,82 which in effect shifted the test to something very 
close to private warranty. 
When one turns to look at the ways in which challenged tenants 
justified their title or others put in their claim, private title comes 
much more to the fore. Rivals cited some donor 83 or protector 84 who 
would vouch for the legitimacy of their tenure. Lords relied on showing 
tenants to be their men to establish lordship over the land. 8S Domesday 
even confirms that men were familiar with the warranty terminology 
itself,86 though the forms used varied a good deal. 87 The best 
defence of tenure was to cite one's grantor, who was usually also the 
same person who had seised you and ought to protect you. If the great 
man failed you, then, as in the classic warranty, you stood to lose 
your land. 88 
The prominence of the king's name and word throughout these title 
disputes is in no way surprising. Twenty years after the Conquest, 
subenfeoffment was still rare in large areas of the country. The king, 
standing betwE!en the disputing parties and some Old English 
"antecessor", remained much the most common grantor, thus also a land 
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claimant's most useful guarantor. William's need to know whom to 
warrant and confirm could have been a major reason for the Domesday 
Inquest. The English situation was quite different from that in 
Normandy, where ducal writs and interventions were still uncommon. 89 
Public memory of past action in the king's name was often the most 
appropriate and effective way of clarifying title in 1086. That said, 
there can be no doubting the familiarity of the landholding classes, in 
England as in Normandy, with the idea of seignorial responsibility for 
the validation and defence of their followers' tenure. The very fact 
that men applied this private language of seisor, protector, advocate 
and warrantor to the king proves that. The Domesday evidence clearly 
indicates that some kind of ideal general customary obligation of Good 
Lordship with regard to tenurial guarantees already existed in the late 
eleventh century. 
The generality of this obligation to warrant places its origins 
firmly into the largely oral society before royal law became supreme. 
Naturally enough, these origins deeply marked the process by which the 
express clauses became standard practice and the common law came to 
take over warranty as its own. But before delving further into the 
narrative of change, two further preliminary tasks remain. 
How had that older world dealt with warranty? To answer this 
question, we need to examine not merely lords' courts, whose important 
influence on the early Common Law has lately been given its proper due, 
but also the shire court of the early twelfth century and the writs by 
which the king could control it. However fragmentary the sources, any 
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understanding that emerges will assist the second task, which is to 
determine the nature and duration of the obligation and whether it was 
restricted to the lives of the original parties. We might well guess 
from warranty"s remote origins as a very personal commitment that it 
was so limited in the twelfth century. A different conclusion emerges, 
however, from arguments similar to those of the last section. It 
appears that from well before the advent of the common law warranty 
was, in principle, a heritable obligation, which normally bound the 
heirs of both principal parties. What this means needs clarification, 
since the whole concept of heritability was in flux during the century 
and warranty changed along with it. These changes pose a further 
question for consideration in the final section of this paper. How did 
it come about that this sometime purely personal commitment became the 
"contractual addition which the tenant mayor not have",90 creating an 
obligation dependent on the closely interpreted terms of his grant? 
The answer demands an examination of the rise of the express warranty 
and some of its important consequences. 
A start can be made by speculating on the treatment of warranty 
in lords' courts during the first half of the twelfth centur~9l 
Initially I make two simplifying assumptions, first that we are dealing 
with a law-suit in a recognisable court,92 and second that the disputed 
holding was vacant without a sitting tenant, as for example after a 
tenant's death when the lord had to decide whom to recognise as his new 
tenant. 93 I shall also exclude questions about the identity of the 
nearest heir, though these must have taken up a good deal of court time 
and obviously needed resolution before a lord could know where to 
confer his warranty. 
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The simplest cases presented no conceptual difficulty. A son or 
other close kinsman could often succeed a deceased tenant without 
opposition. He would simply plead the original grant by the lord (or 
some predecessor) to the deceased (or a predecessor). He would be 
calling upon the lord to warrant that grant and its associated 
seisin. 94 The challenge was conceptually clear, though practical action 
if the lord refused to perform was a different matter, to be dealt with 
outside the courtroom. Legal problems classically arose from competing 
claims to the land. It could easily happen, for example, that two or 
more vassal families could each plead their own apparently valid 
seignorial grant from the past as title to the same holding. This 
might put a new lord in a real quandary, uncertain whose claim was the 
better, who had "maius ius" in the land. His vassals, as suitors of 
his court, were expected to advise him of the most "reasonable" 
decision, that most consonant with "ratio" or custom. In other words, 
they had to help him find an answer which did not clash with what they 
remembered doing in similar cases and which would not cause trouble in 
a future already anticipated. Only in this way could the internal peace 
of the honorial community be assured. 
Contemporary description of the inquiry process is rare. 
Charters very rarely admit to the arguments about warranty whose 
results they must so often have been recording. 95 There do exist, 
however, a few cases on the plea rolls of around 1200 which permit a 
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late glimpse of the kind of circumstances in which such inquiries had 
once been held. Tenants were summoned into a royal court to show I~y 
what warrant" ("quo waranto") they were on the land. In some few cases 
also a private lord sought, in effect, the counsel of royal justices on 
his warranty obligations. By this time, cautious lords had come to 
terms with the danger that ousted tenants might later recover damages 
as well as the land by suing novel disseisin in the royal courts. It 
now made sense to pay the king 96 to put his royal authority behind 
inquiries which earlier lords had happily held off their own bat. 97 
Thus what appears at first an embryonic common-law procedure of "quo 
waranto,,98 actually represents the old-style seignorial inquiries as 
hygienized by royal clerks. Similar royal "quo waranto" cases, where 
the king is himself acting as honorial lord, help to fill out the 
picture. The inquiries frequently mark the lord's own recent 
succession or recovery of control from some rival. They were not always 
simple fact-finding operations. Sometimes the lord hoped to justify the 
resumption of a holding into demesne, after escheat perhaps.99 On 
other occasions, the idea was to discover and perhaps reverse the 
dispositions of some usurper or doubtful predecessor. lOO 
One crucial factor in these cases was the evidence and proof 
available to the claimant. IOI The would-be tenant's strongest card was 
the production of the lord's own charter stating the obligation to 
warrant in unambiguous terms.102 He thus challenged the lord to 
fulfill his proven promise. Even if a charter possessed no more than 
evidentiary force,I03 as many scholars still believe. it must have been 
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very hard to renege directly on terms publicly read out in court. The 
lord's honte was too public to bear. So charters were probably 
conclusive for tenure and the terms of service. I04 But clear cases 
founded on documentary proof must have been rare indeed during the 
first half of the centur~ 
Charters can never have been essential in lords' courts,IOS and 
without one the prudent claimant needed to approach his task with 
careful forethought in advance of any trial. There were doubtless 
plenty of experienced vassals around to consult on strateg~ The 
atmosphere was much more political than most modern courts. I06 The 
well versed pleader had to take into account the kind of honorial 
democracy, which we can glimpse from the vernacular literature of the 
day.I07 He talked elegantly of men's higher qualities, while striving 
to persuade the audience that their interests coincided with his and 
his client's. In theory, of course, the community of peers favoured 
justice and fair play. Certainly, it feared to permit injustice, in a 
community where today's judge (suitor) was inevitably tomorrow's 
petitioner. It took real political savvy embodied in pleas of 
epic character to move a lord and his men. 
It is a fair bet that accomplished pleaders often drew their 
listeners' minds back to dramatic scenes of past seisins and homages. 
Here lies the real importance of the lordship rituals discussed 
alread~I08 Skillfully "remembered", they might perhaps persuade an 
assembly of vassals to take an unexpected view of the concomitant 
warranty. Judgements emerged organically from memories of what men had 
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"seen and heard" of the grant. Battle, that most typically chivalric 
form of settling scores by the "Judgement of God", sparingly used as 
much to promote compromise as for the ultimate proof, lent the process 
essential room for manoeuvre. The challenge was to persuade one's peers 
of your claim to right in terms as much political as legal. Able 
pleaders no doubt tried first to persuade their opponents to concede. 
Failing that, they sought to win over their peers. The court might then 
signal their approval so clearly by a favourable award as to bring 
further pressure on the other side to concede and thus avoid a risky 
duel. This could backfire. Some welcomed the duel, whether trusting in 
their strong right arms in disbelief of divine providence or because 
they piously expected God to intervene on their behalf. The pleader's 
power was limited, but persuasion was always worth a try and was in any 
event the required preliminary.109 
A process of this kind is little susceptible of legal analysis, 
least of all by the distant historialli Such knockdown legal arguments 
as existed mostly go undocumented. IIO One must generally deduce them 
from later common-law sources. One good example is a formal proffer 
and receipt of service made publicly or in a lord's court. Glanvill 
holds that this was sufficient to establish warranty in the king's 
court. The lord's acceptance confirmed the tenure of the claimant, who 
was then seised beyond further denial. lll There is no reason to link 
this logic with Angevin innovations; it clearly antedates the arrival 
of routine royal intervention and would have applied equally well in 
lords' courts. 
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The simple pattern of an "upward claim" to a vacant fee 
proceeding from a would-be tenant's offer of service is no doubt 
atypical. Two (or more) claimants can often be found seeking in effect 
the warranty of the same 10rd. 112 The existence of conflicting 
arrangements for the allocation of the same holding cannot have been a 
rare occurrence. Disseisins resulting from ira ~ malevolentia were no 
royal monopoly and remain pertinent to explanations for the invention 
of the assize of novel disseisin. Until well into the twelfth century, 
a great deal turned on the lord's changing whim. In an age when so much 
depended on memory, lords sometimes simply forgot past promises and 
were certainly much freer to change their mind than later. Twelfth 
century family and estate histories present many tenurial 
discontinuities best understood in this context. 113 The resulting 
disputes could hardly all be confined to convenient vacancies. Not 
infrequently, one claimant arrived to find that the lord had already 
ratified someone else's seisin with all due ceremony. That put the lord 
and his advisers in a spot. 
This situation is the very stuff of courtroom drama, as in the 
trial scenes of contemporary chansons de geste. Romantics might side 
perhaps with the young man they had thought gone for ever, now returned 
to claim his birthright. But the cold voice of precedent and 
conservative stability spoke powerfully in the other direction. However 
good the young man's claim in the custom of some ideal world, 
responsible peers would ask, how could the court now disseise a 
properly entitled tenant who had done no wrong to them or their lord? 
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The argument is powerful. Recently, it has seemed virtually conclusive 
to some. Once a sitting tenant claimed the lord's warranty, it was 
said, his court could not entertain the outside claim.114 
Talk of an absolute bind on lords will seem very strange to 
ordinary historians of English society. Were it not for the acuteness 
and technical ingenuity with which Prof. Milsom argued the case, it 
would hardly demand an answer. Believers in a seignorial world, not 
just in England but allover medieval Europe, have taken it as normal 
to submit land disputes to resolution by a duel before the lord of whom 
the claimants wished to hold. The right to hold such duels was a mark 
of baronial status. Nowhere in the previous literature has there been 
any hint that duels might only be held where the disputed holding was 
vacant, by the tenant's death or otherwise. The supposed iron logic of 
warranty would surely have been recognised somewhere in Europe by a 
writer whose thoughts survive. 
To believe that men felt themselves irrevocably bound by every 
grant once made is to believe in a world without sin. It makes 
warranty too mechanical an obligation for the tough society of the 
early twelfth century, with its largely oral memory. The hard politics 
of the seignorial world unquestionably accepted the ousting of once-
accepted tenants for all kinds of reason, not excluding the making of 
fresh grants of lands previously given to men now out of favour.l lS 
Though this kind of active lordship was, no doubt, especially rife 
during the anarchy of Stephen's reign, it broke out whenever lords were 
free to follow their inclinations, which must include most of the 
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Norman period. Certainly the rivalries and local politics of the 
honorial community were as often behind the ousters and regrants as any 
national allegiances. 
Yet the lord's dilemma was genuine. The question of proof 
nicely encapsulates his difficult~ The court's ultimate recourse, 
when hopes of settlement faded, was to God's judgement through the 
duel. Awareness of this was itself a powerful inducement to come to 
terms. The question for the lord was whether he dare allow a question 
touching so closely on his own conscience and hence public reputation 
to reach God at all. Where the dispute narrowed down to an issue 
between the would-be tenant and his putative lord (the "upward claim"), 
battle would be between lord and vassal. This, though it did 
occasionally happen, was a patent embarrassment to all concerned,116 and 
a pressing invitation to seek outside aid. Il7 
It was probably to meet this situation in particular that the 
right to escambium became an automatic corollary to warranty. This 
right of exchange, especially the notion that the new holding had to be 
of equal value to the old, deserves more emphasis than historians have 
given it. Compensation for loss is an ubiquitous feature of early 
medieval custom. Seldom, however, is the measure of customary 
compensation laid down in advance. With default of warranty, it was 
apparently so well known that express provision was unnecessary,IIB a 
good indication that it proceeded from a particularly clear case. This 
was surely not that of the claimant defeated in his suit for a vacant 
fee. No doubt he too possessed a moral claim to compensation, 
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sometimes quite a weighty one. The peer-suitors might well, having 
found for the opponent with "maius ius" to the particular holding, 
advise their lord that past service entitled the loser to a land grant. 
But this was merely voluntary advice. The lord was under no obligation 
to accept it. One might reasonably expect compensation of considerably 
less value than the lost fee, no more than a compensatory douceur to 
demonstrate the lord's magnanimity.119. The case of a judgement 
ousting a vassal seised with his lord's warranty was of a different 
order. One can well imagine men saying that such a man must receive in 
exchange for his lost fee another of at least equivalent value. His 
right to replacement of what he had lost, to a full escambium, was as 
full a "right" as any could be in the customary world of the early 
twelfth century. It is somewhat remarkable that long before Henry II 
English practice apparently equated the two cases. 
The Common Law's arrival changed things again. A new situation 
arose with that final '~hift of control" which enforced the use of 
royal writs and thus inhibited the exercise of active lordshi~120 But 
challenges to sitting tenants had always encouraged one party or the 
other to appeal to outside aid. We know something about the king's 
assistance on such occasions from surviving writs and records of the 
cases introduced by them. Some of these may have been directed 
expressly at questions of warranty. More than once in the 1130 Pipe 
Roll, we seem to see the king intervening to enforce the right of other 
men's tenants to escambium.121 These together with references to royal 
assistance in land suits apparently by writ show that royal enforcement 
39 
of private warranty was known; for all we can tell, it may have been 
common. One route into royal justice was already well mapped in the 
early twelfth century. From the demandant's point of view, the lord's 
refusal to grant him his due constituted either defectus iustitie or, 
if the court had heard his pleas but reached the wrong conclusion, 
iniustum iudicium. Both of these had long been numbered among the 
king's special rights and there existed an ancient procedure (Tolt) to 
bring cases into the shire court on the broad grounds of "default of 
justice,~122 Hearing arguments about warranty obligations in the shire 
court may already have been quite a familiar experience by 1135.123 
Private courts no doubt played their part too. The ethos of 
competitive lordship must have encouraged appeals by the disgruntled 
and pessimistic to their powerful neighbours. Men probably thought 
first of an overlord,124 then of some other magnate prepared to claim 
the lordship. They might consider commending themselves to anyone 
powerful enough to aid their cause and maintain their gains. We can 
only guess. Twelfth century magnates left far fewer writs than the 
king. Traces of the lost jungle must be sought between the lines, in 
accounts of magnate competition and feud, or in details of apparently 
inexplicable property transfers from one honour to another. The 
jurisdictional picture was certainly more complex than many depictions 
of the seignorial world allow. And the violence of frustrated men 
provided ample justification for those who could to call in royal ai~ 
The second task promised above was to define warranty's limits. 
Who was bound by the promise and who stood to benefit from it? A legal 
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system may, if it wishes, restrict the force of a personal promise to 
the persons of the original principals, promisor and promisee. 
Equally, it can permit either principal to pass on his legal position 
to others by inheritance and/or assignment inter vivos. The Common Law 
did not easily extend from the original parties to others the burdens 
and benefits of their agreements and promises. Yet in the developed 
Common Law, warranty was as fully transmissible as the property right 
it represented. How long had this been so and how did it come about? 
Warranty can presumably outlast the joint life of the original 
principals only when the tenurial and vassalic relationships are 
perceived to be continuing or permanent, a point with obvious 
implications for the heritability of land tenure. 
The early plea rolls leave no doubt that under the royal law of 
Richard 1'8 reign warranties extended to the heirs of the parties.125 
S.E. Thorne contended that this position owed much to recent 
developments. In his opinion, the watershed came c. 1175 at about the 
time when the Assize of Mort Dancestor was introduced. Before that 
date, homage had, he felt, created no more than a personal link between 
the two principals who had performed and received it. Now it began to 
be seen as barring the lord's resumption of his land for the whole 
duration of the tenant's (direct) line. The grantee's performance of 
homage acquired for him "a permanent warrant", and estopped the lord-
grantor from all legitimate re-entry other than by forfeiture or 
eschea~ Charter draftsmen now less and less frequently recited the 
consent to alienation of the grantor's heirs and kinsmen (the so-called 
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laudatio parentum), now trusting for their clients' tenurial security 
in the permanent "homage bar" and warranty commitments. Previously, he 
held, a man's heirs had had to bind themselves personally to the 
ancestor's grant; simply being the grantor's heir created no 
obligation. Similarly, heirs of a grantee could not automatically 
benefit from the personal promises made to their ancestor. Some new 
commitment was needed to bind the ancestor's grantor (or his heir) 
afresh to them. The crucial change came when heirs began to enjoy 
royal assistance in their suits on a regular basis. From 1176 onwards 
the Assize of Mort Dancestor did more than just enforce a warranty; it 
enf orced the "recovery" of seis in.126 
Prof. Thorne, perhaps less interested in heritability as such 
than the rise of ownership at Common Law, cited only enough charters to 
establish the absence before c. 1175 of a regular royal procedure to 
compel heirs to honour their ancestors' warranty promises. l27 Present 
needs require more than that, for the birth of the Common Law was in no 
way the start of our story. I have already pointed out some of the 
ways in which warranty was enforced without royal participation. 
Similarly, many sons confidently expected to succeed to their fathers' 
lands long before the king routinely guaranteed rights of 
inheritance.l 28 To put it at its lowest, the father's long service and 
tenure persuaded the community that his heir, ceteris paribus, 
possessed a better claim to succeed than any stranger. And the same 
peers accepted the corollary, that an heir should, if he could, pay his 
deceased father's debts and fulfil other residual obligations. These 
42 
rights and duties existed in men's minds largely independent of the 
existence of formal legal remedies, which was one reason why lords 
sometimes agonised over questions about tenant-right in the manner 
already discussed. If this is so, the emergence of common-law warranty 
has to have been a more complex matter than Thorne's highly compressed 
account permits it to seem. I shall suggest that it was a gradual 
affair, best understood in terms of the gradual hardening of tenurial 
customs into a set of legal rules about ownership and inheritance 
rights. 129 
The length of time it took for clauses reciting kinsmen's consent 
to grants to drop out of drafting practice indicates that the process 
was only loosely connected with the provision of new royal remedies. 
This cannot be proved in a straightforward manner. Disappearances are 
hard to document and the formulas are only after all indirect 
representations of conveyancing practice.130 In any case the English 
clauses were never as forthright as those to be found in France. l3l 
They have the air of reciting assents, rather than consents whose 
refusal could invalidate the transactio~ Successful challenge by 
disgruntled kinsmen was also rarer than across the Channel. So there 
was less to disappear than might be thought. On the other hand, consent 
clauses can occasionally be found well into the next centur~ Consents 
probably only became genuinely superfluous -- drafting conservatism 
aside after kinsmen found their attempts to challenge grants in the 
royal courts barred one by one by ingenious royal justices. l32 This 
takes us at least into John's reign, and thus brings us within the 
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chronological range found in Northern France.133 The evidence of the 
consent clauses, then, favours a hypothesis of gradual change less 
dependent on particular legal innovations than Thorne implied. 
Indications that warranty agreements bound the parties' heirs even 
before the Angevin legal reforms strengthen the argument. The donor's 
heir may be taken first. Was he bound in the mid-twelfth century to 
honour his ancestor's promise of warranty? This was not the open-and-
shut question it became later under the Common Law. The important 
factors are the means and criteria by which an heir tried to make up 
his mind and the methods hopeful tenants used to persuade him. These 
varied according to the nature of the tenurial interest. The more 
precarious and impermanent this was, the less strongly could an 
ancestor's wish commit his successors. The moment of succession was 
then the one when the prudent heir most needed advice from his amici, 
extending perhaps to the kind of "Quo Warranto" inquiry already 
mentioned. By Glanvill's day, the inquiry should have been a formality 
unless the donee's seisin was in some way tainted. The king's court 
would now compel an heir to warrant any full grant (vera donatio) of 
his ancestor and predecessor-in-title. As Glanvill himself puts it, 
'~he heirs of donors are bound to warrant to the donees and their heirs 
the gifts and the things given, in so far as they were given 
rationabiliter".134 
Glanvill's formulation prompts one to ask how commonly grants 
were left incomplete. Cases from the earliest royal plea rolls 
frequently turn on just this issue,135 and were quite often pleaded in 
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the language of warranty.l36 The classic examples are family 
arrangements, especially deathbed grants to younger sons, and gages of 
land. Glanvill's round declaration, that a nuda promissio of this kind 
was insufficient to create a valid legal claim, "secundum consuetam 
regni interpretationem", surely implies a general custom beyond the 
bounds of the curia regis which was his main concern. 137 Many, perhaps 
most, gifts to laymen in the third quarter of the twelfth century and 
before were in fact incomplete in this Glanvillian sense. Prof. Thorne 
showed some forty years ago that Glanvill's requirement for livery of 
seisin, meaning the public delivery of possession to an incoming 
grantee, was another Angevin creation. l38 The symbolic investitures 
common earlier in the century, even had they been performed with enough 
publicity to attract through local jurors the notice of the royal 
courts, would not have swayed Angevin justices. Such grants would 
normally have remained among those private convenciones which the curia 
regis was not in the habit of dignifying with recognitio~139 Any 
warranties contained naturally shared the grant's fate. This had not 
greatly worried men a generation earlier. In the mid-twelfth century, 
charter draftsmen simply sought to express their grantors' wishes in 
the form that seemed to offer the best chance of lasting effect. l40 
Their charters rarely contain warranty clauses specifically limited to 
the original grantor. Some kind of plausible explanation can often be 
attempted for first person warranties. 141 Some, for example, are 
confirmations or similar personal supplements to an earlier grant by 
someone else.142 It certainly looks as if draftsmen felt from the 
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beginning that the onus was on them to explain why an express warranty 
clause should not commit the warrantor's heirs.l 43 Certainly, the 
vast majority purport to bind the donor and his heirs to the donee and 
his heirs.144 This more-or-less standard formula predates Henry II and 
his reforms by some years, a generation before comparable clauses 
appeared in France. I conclude that Englishmen already believed that 
in normal circumstances heirs ought to honour their ancestors' 
warranties. 145 
A similar logic probably applies to the heirs of the grantees. 
Charters that expressed warranties as due to the grantee and his heirs 
-- which almost all did -- most probably meant what they said. l46 
Historians doubting this in the past may have been swayed by what seems 
to be a contradiction between two passages in Glanvill. The one 
already quoted states clearly that in full grants warranty is owed by 
donors and their heirs to donees and theirs. This authoritative 
formulation in a book devoted to questions about inheritance and under 
the early rubric ''De heredum warantizatione" seems to leave no room for 
doubt in the matter. However, in Glanvi1l's later discussion of 
homage, he deduces from the mutual bond that: 
"If anyone gives to another for his service and homage 
any tenement later proved against him by another, 
the lord is indeed bound to warrant the tenement to 
him {the donee} or render him an appropriate 
exchange. The case of someone who holds his fee 
from another as an inheritance is, however, 
different. because the lord is not bound to an 
exchange even if he (the hereditary tenant) loses 
that land. ,,147 
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There is no denying the difficulty of reconciling these two dicta. The 
restriction to holdings "sicut hereditatem" may. however. point 
towards a solution. It suggests that Glanvill had in mind here a 
distinction. between acquisitions and inheritance which was 
obsolescent but still alive as he wrote. 148 It seems to harken back to 
a past when alienation was abnormal, so that a lord might perhaps feel 
that his obligation expired with his grantee. who ought to have made 
his own arrangements to secure the holding for his heir. This had not 
wholly passed out of current use in Glanvill's time. The sentence is 
likely to be better evidence for recent royal policy on the 
enforcement of warranty. than for the scope of the obligation more 
generally. If this is unacceptable. the difficulty will have to await 
another explanation. which may well turn out to be very specific.149 
But perhaps Glanvill simply erred. In any event. I prefer to follow 
the passage most consistent with the obvious interpretation of the 
charters themselves. 
The cl inching argument. to my mind. comes from grants to 
religion. Thl~ir draftsmen must always have intended to create a 
permanent effect; the saintly grantees and most of those whose souls 
were meant to benefit were already dead. The enduring relationship 
between land. church and the souls close to the grantor's heart was 
central to the whole act. The draftsman's priority was to discourage 
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grantors and their kinsmen from all further interference in grants 
once made. His language had already advanced far towards common form 
by the early twelfth century.150 The feeling that grants in alms 
really ought to be permanent was old and widespread. Members of the 
grantor's family had an interest and some kind of obligation to uphold 
his grant from which they and their souls stood to benefit --
permanently.lSI Their obligation had to be of equal duration to the 
grantees'. The grant in alms, if it were made in due form -- "sicut 
rationabiliter facte" was already the classic example of a gift 
with permanent warranty. 
One might argue that church draftsmen were careful, precisely 
because alms were different and lay warranties normally unenforceable 
by the donee's heirs, a view that has some force for the early years 
of the century. More probably, the warranty clauses enjoyed by 
ecclesiastical beneficiaries showed everyone that warranty could be a 
continuing commitment. The lay recipient of a charter containing a 
similar warranty clause would wonder why the security of tenure 
granted him with such eclat should not extend also to his heir. 
Doubtless the grantor and his heirs frequently and perhaps 
legitimately took a different view. The original grant, especially if 
for little or no service, might be impugned as not made 
rationsbiliter, for example, because it constituted a disproportionate 
alienation. l52 It may have been almost as common here as in France 
for a newly succeeded heir to question his predecessor's grants in 
this way.IS3 He and his advisers might feel that circumstances 
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abundantly justified them refusing particular tenants' homage. Such 
complaints did trouble the courts at the time of the early plea rolls. 
But these are the exceptions. The primary fact is the growing number 
of express clauses phrased to join in mutual obligation not only the 
parties but their heirs. Quite swiftly, these built up the atmosphere 
of permanent commitment to the point where the nascent common law 
could, perhaps had to, turn it into a rulL 
This conclusion accords nicely with an emerging view of the 
rise of heritability in twelfth-century England. It points, indeed, 
towards a reconciliation of the commonsensical perceptions of general 
historians that men did in fact succeed their fathers throughout the 
century, with the lawyers' careful distinctions designed to show what 
was changed by the origin of common law inheritance rights. 154 Ex 
hypothese men were enforcing warranties against the heirs of deceased 
grantors during the early twelfth century. We can rarely see them 
doing so, because the proceedings were largely unrecorded. When suits 
for inheritance (lawyers might prefer to say non-testamentary 
succession) are visible, most fail to mention warranty at all. Yet 
these hidden cases, routine perhaps in seignorial and local courts, 
are tbe essential context for the occasional royal enforcement of 
private warranties from Henry I's time. iS5 The king was doing nothing 
too revolutionary. He simply granted to the favoured few an 
exceptional remedy for wrongs to widely recognised customary rights. 
Before Henry II there was perhaps no legal inheritance right in 
England, though there certainly were succession customs which the 
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king, among others, would sometimes help to enforce. Undeniably the 
provision of regular royal remedies constituted a key change, which 
soon made the succession of an undoubted heir to his inheritance all 
but automatic. As we shall see, the dating and character of this 
process are matters of judgement. But whatever position one takes on 
them, the advent of regular royal procedures can hardly have created 
"ownership". Rather was an existing tenuous, customary ownership 
brought under royal protection to be strengthened, defined and 
formalized. 
3. The written record and its consequences. 
Much of the argument up to this point stands or falls on 
evidence from express clauses of warranty. This may seem a trifle 
perverse, when as late as 1150, many laymen still possessed no 
charters at all, and warranty clauses remained the privilege of a tiny 
minority. The arrival of express clauses in force was still changing 
warranty in crucial respects as it emerged into the glare of the 
Common Law day. Clearly, one ought to conclude with some account of 
the process by which it became normal to express warranty obligations 
in writing.156 
The crux is not warranty's sporadic first appearances in 
writing,157 but the time when express clauses began to appear the 
norm, more specifically the date when they become a routine part of 
enfeoffments. Precocious examples apart,158 warranty clauses are 
hardly found before the middle of Henry II's reign159 and are still 
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not completely normal at the end of the century.l60 Their diversity 
of formula, while confirming that warranty was no novelty in the late 
twelfth century, also rules out any simple timetable of change. Once 
draftsmen had decided that the obligation had to be inserted into 
their texts, they drew on a range of forms as wide as for any other 
formula. It seems certain that the changes under consideration were 
not due to any local factors but related to the emergence of the royal 
Common Law. 
There is this time a strong case for attributing the new 
practice to Church initiative. All the earliest examples of express 
clauses come in grants to religion, at a time when ecclesiastical 
beneficiaries still had such an edge in drafting experience that the 
end result was: likely to reflect their choices over those of their lay 
benefactors.l61 Was there perhaps some special difficulty inherent in 
grants to the Church which spurred men to have their warranty 
undertakings put into writing? Did the key lie, for example, in grants 
reserving little or no service to the grantor, which are much more 
frequent than between laymen? In addition to the obvious consequence 
that a serviceless grantor was that much less capable of bearing the 
obligations due from his own lands, grants in free alms seldom 
produced any visible service to serve as evidence of the warranty 
obligation.162 Ecclesiastical draftsmen had good reason to be 
cautious here. l63 
Of course beneficiary drafting was not ubiquitous. By the 
second half of the century, great lay lords were certainly producing 
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their own charters and thus controlling their form. 164 Yet the 
movement towards express warranty clauses probably owes a great deal 
to the fears of potential grantees. Religious houses, in particular, 
no doubt first made warranty express in cases where trouble was 
anticipated from the very making of the grant. 165 Actual warranty 
clauses occasionally make explicit the parties' fear of a doubtful 
title or a mighty neighbour, by adding to the usual general warranty a 
specific promise to help against some named person, "et nominatim 
contra X".166 This form, which afforces the original obligation, and 
thus gives the grantee something extra, supports the hypothetical 
origin in beneficiary drafting. l67 From monasteries, then, the idea 
of express clauses as the kind of guarantee no tenant should be 
without filtered into the lay world. 
Two other phenomena of the late twelfth century also 
influenced the rise of express clauses in important ways, the '~trict 
construction" of the evidence for warranty and the advent of routine 
royal remedies against against default. Since by this time warranty 
can be equated with tenant-right, the rise of the real actions must 
have been a major determinant. Warranty enforcement cannot have 
marched out of step with royal control of land litigation, without 
disturbing most reasonable assumptions about legal change in the 
period.168 The warranty material thus serves incidentally as a 
coherence test of recent views on the Angevin reforms. 
It is reasonable to seek a watershed in the tenurial 
settlement made at the close of the civil war between Stephen and the 
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future Henry II. One recent view goes beyond this to argue that 
besides the formal Treaty of Westminster, which ended the political 
hostilities there had stood a further settlement setting out a special 
new rule for deciding the property disputes inevitable after a long 
period of civil strife.169 I am not yet convinced of the existence of 
such a new but undocumented rule, well though it would fit some 
features of legal development later in the reign. 170 As Professor 
Milsom says, "It is doubtful whether we should think of an essentially 
legisla tive act intended to govern the future".171 
How far the stream of royal decisions and confirmations in Henry 
Irs first years began while Stephen was still alive is relatively 
unimportant for our picture of the development of warranty and tenant-
right. Much more to the point is the probability that the flow of acta 
was unusually large. 172 The whole period from the Treaty of 
Westminster late in 1153 on into the first year or so of the new reign 
was characterised by a high degree of confusion about where men stood, 
the precise nature of their rights and liabilities under the emerging 
regime. 173 No wonder they flocked to seek confirmations from the new 
king. If a substantial number of these petitioners were under-tenants, 
as seems likely, their pleas must have been the major springboard for 
royal justice into the sphere of real property.174 Presumably all 
claims against grantees of confirmations would automatically be within 
royal jurisdiction and thus entitled to a writ from the beginning. 175 
This alone could explain why Henry was already legislating against 
disseisins from as early as 1156 or l15~176 The royal interest in 
tenant-right which this implies would then date from the king's 
coronation or before. 
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Progress will have been very uneven. 177 The natural emphasis 
on Novel Disseisin and the great eyre visitation of 1165--6, does less 
than justice to other less easily discernible advances with equal 
impact at the time. The Assize of Novel Disseisin did not stand alone. 
A constitutio about Tolt from "the very early years of the reign", for 
example, perhaps in origin a royal gesture on behalf of disinherited 
Angevin supporters, also attests to the king's willingness already at 
this early date to intervene in land cases on a substantial scale.178 
It appears nevertheless that it was only from about 1170 that the king 
and his advisers began to take a direct interest in the identity of 
the sitting tenant (deforciant) when granting writs "de recto".179 a 
change which must reflect a fresh or intensified royal will to deter 
lords from any inclination towards unthinking warranty of sitting 
tenants. A further burst of rationalisation after the guerra of 1173-
4, partly embodied in the Assize of Northampton of 1176. may even have 
been pivota 1.1 80 
Routine royal intervention was a function of the introduction 
of the real actions. The 1170s look to be the first decade when royal 
land actions reached a critical mass that compelled judicial 
reflection on the nature. proof and enforcement of private warranty, 
and property right in general. The first block of pipe rolls payments 
for warranty default etc. in 1169 could mark a step-up in royal 
interest. 181 Other tests point to a second stage of development. By 
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about the start of the thirteenth century, for example, the maxim that 
no man need answer for his free tenement without a royal writ had 
completed its journey from statement of fact to Common-law rule,l82 
and the once valid novel disseisin defence of ouster on good grounds 
by legitimate judgement of one's own court was passing out of use. l83 
Occasional warranty writs appear almost from the start of the 
reign. The first kind was a royal order in "Precipe" form that a named 
person should warrant the beneficiary. This is already recognisable, 
from the first extant example dated 1156/7, as a predecessor of the 
Common-Law writ De Warantia Carte, the only important difference being 
that it did not always refer to a charter.184 What we do not know, 
even for the period from the 1180s when pipe roll payments appear, is 
how common it was. For a long time, it probably remained a favour to 
be purchased. The pipe rolls reveal the existence of two other new 
writs at about this time. One, in summons form (first evidenced 
1179), was issued at the justices' discretion interlocutory in actions 
of right and dower. Though itself of little lasting legal importance, 
it usefully indicates the growing scale of royal intervention. The 
other new writ (first evidenced 117m, later called the De Homagio 
Capiendo, enjoyed a certain popularity into the early thirteenth 
century. Glanvill's account associates it with the single situation 
of an heir in possession but unable to secure his lord's blessing for 
his tenur e. l 85 
The provision of new writs for situations connected to voucher 
suggests that men close to the seat of power were beginning to be 
55 
aware of some consequences of the new remedies. We have no way of 
knowing in detail how the royal courts dealt with warranty disputes in 
the earliest stageL Strict construction of express clauses is 
already evident on the first extant plea rolls in the mid-II 90s, but 
was perhaps less stringent than it later became. l86 These facts 
slowly trickled into the general consciousness. Charter draftsmen 
gradually began to follow the lead of the royal courts, now 
increasingly the forum most relevant to their labours. More careful 
drafting and the inclusion of express clauses into all grants intended 
to carry warranty was no more than the prudent response and does not 
seem on present evidence to have been at all general before the very 
end of the twelfth century. The whole process must have taken about 
two generations, one for the king to take control and a second for men 
to perceive this. 
Such, in crude outline is the change to be explained. One 
possible hypothesis to deal with the matter in much the same terms as 
it has been stated can be deduced from the pages of The Legal 
Framework of English Feudalism. A Milsomian view might start from the 
"shift of control" consequent upon the new royal law of the real 
actions and run something like this. Lords and other grantors had 
after 1166 to face the fact that royal law could force a new tenant 
upon them against their wishes, while at the same time forcing them to 
compensate by exchange their preferred old one. They suddenly had to 
treat promises of warranty even more seriously than before. Charters 
and express clauses rapidly came to seem desirable, even essential, to 
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limit grantors' liability by clarifying its bounds. As obligations 
were specified with greater care and precision, men took an ever more 
combative attitude towards them. The royal justices, because they 
lacked detailed knowledge of the local circumstances that spawned 
disputes before them, were driven back on charter texts. Stricter 
construction of the written evidence was the result, in a kind of 
trade-off by which the courts only enforced warranty against lords in 
the clearer cases, the more obvious situations where warranty had to 
be implied or 'where the charters were indisputable. This has all the 
appearance of agreed damage control by the courts in the interest of 
10rds. 187 
This account, for all its illuminating aspects, cannot be the 
whole answer. Our warranty material raises general questions about the 
Angevin legal reforms, on the balance between conscious innovation and 
unanticipated, consequential change, and the direction of any central 
policy behind royal interventions into land law. Strict construction 
of the charters by the royal courts is central to the answers, a 
natural judicial response, perhaps, to the challenge of providing 
outsider justice for situations previously dealt with primarily within 
the disputants:' home community.188 Royal warranty cases are 
essentially unrecorded before the mid-1190s. The first plea rolls do 
not in any case reveal the personal contacts and choices which 
influenced the justices' decisions. 189 But they do already show much 
the same tendency as later to construe charter formulas strictly 
according to technical rules of interpretation. Angevin justices, 
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buttressed by their education in the learned laws and their high 
opinion of royal supremacy,l90 were not afraid to declare from on high 
the proper interpretation of custom. With the arrival of the 
returnable writ in the 1170s, they had a "set text" around which to 
concentrate their minds. With this background, strict construction 
looks more like an inevitable part of common-law warranty than 
something which needed time to develop. 
There is little attraction in positing some implicit policy 
decision initiated at levels above that of the justices. Significant 
legal change did not always proceed from conscious legislative choices 
in the middle ages and there was little reason for policy decisions 
about warranty once the real actions surely the product of more 
conscious political decision than the Milsomian view allowed -- were 
in existence. To reach common-law warranty from their starting-point, 
the justices could have merely followed the logic of the new remedies 
to the better protection of tenant-right. 191 
A conscious political decision might well have come down 
against the "lords" anywa~ Charters and express clauses in the first 
instance benefit grantees not grantors, warrantees rather 
than warrantors. Some of the earliest royal cases about warranty show 
the lengths to which lords would go in court to wriggle out of 
promises, even when recorded on their own charters.192 A lords' 
lobby, out to design common-law warranty in its own interest might 
have argued against all implied warranty, insisting on the clearest 
possible written evidence. But no such lobby could have existed, when 
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all "lords" were also someone else's men. And any such argument ran 
directly contrary to the main thrust of the Angevin reforms in land 
law. A rather more plausible route from our earlier world to common-
law warranty was via the justices' dutiful pursuit of the logic of 
the real actions in defence of tenant-right. This general policy 
would not exclude the occasional "political" verdict in particular 
cases. But to do justice was one of the first promises the king made 
at his coronatiolli Henry II's resolve in the matter no doubt derived 
as much from his awareness of the profit and prestige to be gained 
thereby witness the pipe rolls -- as by the distant example of his 
grandfather. There is no need to colour Angevin attitudes with 
exaggerated idealism. Until Magna Carta, kings took great care to 
ensure that the new concern for tenant-right did not infect the 
politics of relations with tenants-in-chief; the new procedures did 
not apply within the royal honor. l93 On the other hand, the king and 
his justices were quite sensitive to cries of ''Foull'' from the 
politically influential. Most likely, conscious royal intervention, if 
any, was moderated by the conservative desire not to disturb unduly 
the status quo. Thus, in principle, it favoured enforcement of 
warranty at least for settled holdings. Richard FitzNeal knew what he 
was doing c. 1179, when he apprised his Exchequer pupil of a general 
royal policy of aiding tenants against their "domestic enemies", the 
lords.l 94 Here lay the basic theme of the law reforms. 
This picture, with its suggestions about the roles of beneficiary 
drafting and ecclesiastical inspiration in the rise of express 
59 
warranty clauses, cannot be merged into a Milsomian one. Nor can a 
primarily legal analysis take the matter much further. The torch is 
ready for the political historians. Law and legal change were never 
more obviously part of the political process than in Angevin England, 
a fact which the purest legal historian must respect. A combined 
approach seems promising. I have tried here to indicate some of the 
ways in which it might go. There is first the broader perspective. The 
knowledge that warranty patterns straddle the Channel could encourage 
comparative study of the different ways in which English and French 
courts treated tenant-right. 195 The splitting-up of a single customary 
world during the century following Henry of Anjou's acquisition of the 
English crown is a dazzling phenomenon. Grand comparisons between the 
fates of similar custom under different regimes offer a fresh 
perspective on the birth of the English Common Law, ready for testing 
against the details of English litigatio~ Here lies the other 
potential strength of a combined approach. Where possible in this 
paper, I have tried to supplement the legal historian's tried method 
of analysing the COmmon law from its own records, with extra-legal 
evidence from private charters and royal records. Especially from 
John's reign on, when a variety of legal and financial records can be 
brought together, historians have on occasion used the pipe and fine 
rolls to considerable effect to bring out aspects of litigation 
omitted by the plea rolls. 196 Patently, royal financial records of the 
twelfth century, such as they are, have a good deal to add to our 
understanding of the Common Law at its pre- and peri-natal stages. 197 
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But just as the legal system and its doctrine as a whole should 
be related to national politics, so, ideally, must we approach each 
individual case as a piece of local history, a still greater challenge 
for the historian of English law, because of the very scattered nature 
of local sources.198 Perhaps regional and estate specialists will 
deploy their expertise to criticize the legal arguments. By 
establishing at what date express clauses became de rigeur on their 
patch, for instance, they will adjust the global pattern proffered 
here, and, more important, the anomalies they expose may compel 
reconsideration of some of the causal arguments. 
Warranty has proved a useful starting-point for investigation 
of the I~eudal Framework of English Law,~l99 It nicely encapsulates 
one of the great paradoxes of the twelfth-century's discovery of the 
individual. One might expect such an age to place great weight on 
personal relationships such as the bond of homage between lord and 
vassal. To the contrary. in the course of the Century of the 
Individual. wi~rranty was institutionalised and very largely extracted 
from the realm of personal relations into that of impersonal written 
contract. For all the twelfth century's talk about human values and 
individuation, movement from personal choice to institutionalisation 
-- from status to contract -- is seldom far from centre-stage. 
Footnotes to WARRANTY AND GOOD-LORDSHIP IN TWELFTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND 
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* The rough draft from which this paper grew was composed at 
the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton in 1980 and tested 
at the First Cal tech-Weingart Conference in the Humanities the 
next year. I completed it during my year as a Sherman Fairchild 
Distinguished Scholar at Caltech in 1985. The reactions of Donald 
Sutherland and Eleanor Searle at the 1981 conference and of Paul 
Brand, Jeffrey Hackney, John Hudson and Steven D. White to 
intermediate drafts have all left noticeable impressions on the 
present shape of the argument. I am grateful to them all and 
especially for those responsible for my fruitful stays in 
Princeton and Pssadena. My wife Elaine Marcotte Hyams, as always, 
has contributed in many diverse ways. 
1. S.F.C. Milsom, !h~ 1~g~1 f~~mework Q! ~nglish Feudalism 
(Cambridge 1976) is the prime illustration of what can be done 
by clever and imaginative speculation on the things Common-Law 
sources exclude. LA. Green, "Societal Concepts of Criminal 
Liability for Homicide", Speculum xlvii (1972), 669-94 is 
another good example of the technique. On the other hand, A.W.B' 
Simpson has shown in his Cannibalism and the Common Law (Chicago 
1984) and other recent studies what standard historians' 
research can contribute to the understanding of leading cases 
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from the modern period. Even for the medievalist there are other 
options, such as working from the records of one or more 
monastic houses. M.T. Clanchy, "A medieval realist: 
interpreting the rules at Barnwell, Priory, Cambridge", 
Perspectives in Jurisprudence, ed. E.A.G. Attwooll, Glasgow 
1977, 176-94) makes good use of a register composed in the 
l290s. I hope myself to examine The Chronicle of Battle Abbey, 
ed. E. Searle (Oxford Medieval Texts, Oxford 1980) against the 
background of the house's charters with something similar in 
mind. 
2. ~~~!y Yorkshire fh~~!~~~ [hereafter ~Xfl, ed. W. Farrer and C. 
T. Clay (12 vols., vols. i-iii Edinburgh 1914-6, vols. iv-xii 
and index vol. to vols. i-iii Yorks. Arch. Soc., extra series i-
x 1935-65); I treat Charters of the Honour of Mowbray. 1107-
1191, ed. D. E. Greenway (London 1972) as an extension of the 
series. The most surprising fact about EYC, with its wealth of 
material buttressed by the immense learning and good judgement 
of its editors, Farrer, Clay and now Greenway, is perhaps the 
remarkably little use legal historians have made of it. Even so, 
the number of cases that can be understood in the round remains 
small. Appendix II carries details of some of the more knowable 
ones. 
3. See my article on "The Common Law and the French Connection" in 
R. Allen Btown (ed.), !'~Q£~edings of !he Battle Conference .Q!l 
~~g!Q=No~man Studie! !~~ 1981 (Boydell Press, 1982), 77-92, esp. 83-4. 
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4. The text does not pretend to a nuanced survey of the previous 
literature on warrsnty. The main lines of inquiry can be traced 
from the following: Sir F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, The 
~!~tory of English La~ (2nd edn., Cambridge 1898). i. 301, 306-
7; ii. 158. 162-4, 662-4 etc.; S.J. Bailey, "Warranties of land 
in the thirteenth century". Cambridge 1~~ Journal [hereafter 
CLJI viii (1942-4), 274-90 and ix (1945-7). 82-106; idem, 
"Warranties of land in the reign of Richard I", CLl ix 0945-7), 
192-209; S. E. Thorne, "English feudalism and estates in land", 
CLJ (1959), 193-209; A. W. B; Simpson, An Introduction to the 
History of Land Law (Oxford 1961), IS, 49-50, 109-10, 118 sq. 
For Milsom, see the next note. Maitland seems, as usual, to have 
made some of the observations crucial to the argument here long 
ago; see below n. 30. 
5. For warranty see esp. pp. 42-7, 58-9, 61-4, 75-7, 85-6, 108-9, 
121, 126-32, 172-4, 183-4. Some of what follows is developed 
from my review in English Historical Review xciii (1978), 856-
61. 
6. The expression "good lordship" was probably a later medieval 
coinage. I follow the classic usage of K. B~ McFarlane, The 
Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford 1973), 113-4. 
7. Many lawyers and some legally minded historians deny the 
existence of rights in the period before there existed a Common 
Law to enforce them. The timely arrival on my desk of a draft 
paper by S.D. White on "Legal Argument and Claims to 
64 
Inheritances in Western French Courts, c. 1050 to c. 1150: their 
Implicat.ions for the Study of Earlier Anglo-French Law" did much 
to reassure me that the usage here is defensible. I accept, of 
course, that tenant-right is something broader than warranty, in 
any worl.d other than one where being put in by the lord is the 
only acceptable form of title, a view of restricted twelfth-
century tenant-right that I cannot share. Tenants', defences, 
such as a simple denial putting the demandant to proof of his 
right, imply something more. On the other hand, the warranty 
equation can only apply to those honourable tenures, which the 
Common Law will term tenure in, or as of, fee, where the tenant 
has full right (iuJ!). Warranty of a lessee by his lessor does 
not convey right, nor conversely can a lessee expect warranty in 
the absence of express provision between them. 
8. Any attempt to clarify what is meant by "family" here and later 
would involve a consideration of what French historians call 
Laudatiq Parentum. This is the practice by which charters recite 
the consent of kinsmen (and lords) of the grantor in an apparent 
effort to restrain their later interference in the grant. I 
eagerly await elucidation of the practice in Stephen D. White, 
Custom, Kinship and Gifts .t.£! Saints (Studies ill Legal History, 
U. of N. Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, N.C., forthcoming 1985). 
See also Emily Tabuteau, "Transfer of Property in Eleventh-
Century Norman Law" (Harvard Ph. D. Thes is 1975), 803-27. I am 
grateful to Dr. Tabuteau for letting me see, in addition to her 
dissertation, a draft for the warranty chapter in her 
forthcoming book. 
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9. I say something more below on the extent to which positive and 
negative warranty did constitute a single institution. There is 
room for further research on customary practices here. 
10. The hypothesis is of course essentially a deduction from Common-
Law sources; see Hilsom, Le~l Eramewo~~, index s.vv. Glanvill, 
Plea roll entries. 
11. The earliest example noted, EYC i. 265 = EYC iv. lIB (c.1137/61) 
was in fact made by a religious house, St.Hary's, York, on whose 
perhaps precocious drafting care Bee below text at D. 74. $ee 
further!X£ viii. 111 (1159/64), made in the court of Earl 
Warenne aDd EYC iii. 1405 (1160/c.70), a ministerial grant. 
12. As pointed out by Hilsom, Legal Framework, cap.4. 
13. The two exceptions noted are both late and unusual. In EYC x. 
114 0194/ B), the ,lay vendor promised to return the purchase 
price if he was unable to warrant his sale. EYC v. 321 (early 
13th cent.) was a grant (without reservation of tenure) to the 
grantor's lord; its warranty clause no doubt reflects unequal 
bargaining power. 
14. Three confirmations to Fountains, each repeating with added 
warranty a confirmation already provided, suggest a house 
policy: EYC xi. 21 (1156/75) after ibid. 20 (1156/62); EYC xi. 
140 (c.1180/90), to be compared with nos. 139-40; EYC xi. 43 
(c.1l82/1204), to be compared with nos. 25, 38. 
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15. Ji:Xf ii. 710, 716 (c. 1160/70, 1178/81); cf. also EYC i. 50, 55 
(1187/1207, 1170/86); iii. 1535,1605 (1165/80, c. 1175/1200) 
etc. If this suggestion is correct, it would be interesting to 
know whE!n the later presumption of tenure came in. Cf. Milsom, 
LF, 51, 91, 144-5. P.Landau, Jus Patronatus: Studien ~ 
Entwick)~ des Patronats im Dekreta1enrecht und der Kanonistik 
des ~ und ~ Jahrhunderts (Forschungen zur Kirchlichen 
Rechtsgeschichte und zum Kirchenrecht xii, Cologne 1975) details 
the Church's view of what lay patronage ought to be like; its 
problem was to destroy the proprietary view of the lay interest 
without opening up too unrealistic a gulf from "consuetudo", ie 
such customs as the English law under consideration here. The 
patron ]cetained the "honor" of defending the church from 
material deterioration, Landau, 129. 
16. ~lanvill, iii. 3. I, 7 (ed. Hall, 38, 42).See below Appendix 
for details of these writs. For dower, see Glanvill vi. 4-13 
(ed. Hall, 60-65) and cf. Bailey, CLJ ix, 196-7, 202-3. The 
language of lordship was, it is true, used of husbsnds (the 
wife's 90minus) and there is also the unusual case of the heir 
who must warrant in claims for dower from his deceased father. 
On the question of whether the heir was the doweress' lord 
before 1176, see R.C. Palmer, "The Origins of Property in 
England", Law and History Review iii (1985), 13 sq. 
17. Glanvil~ x. 15; pace Hall, 130, n. I, the reference back is 
surely to Glanvill vii. 2 on which see below text st n. 134. 
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18. Glanvill x. 15-7 (ed.Hall, 130-1). CRR viii. 271-2, 277-8 (1220) 
is a well-known case of horse theft that started in a court of 
the earl of Brittany. 
19. II Atr., 8-8. 2; II Cn., 23, 24. 1-2 (In.); WI.Art., 5; 
Leg.Wmi., 21-21. 3, 45; E.Cf., 22. 3, 28. lao All these are 
cited from vol. I of F.Liebermann Gesetze der Angelsachsen (3 
vols. Halle 1903-16) by the sigla there adopted. Also Assize of 
Clarendon 1166, c.12. 
20. Hn., 43. 1,94. 3 envisage a lord warranting his man against 
royal accusations of wounding and the like; Ibid., 85. 2-2& 
makes it clear that this was not licit in cases of serious 
crime. Cf. also Hn. Mon., 2 (possession of false coins). This 
kind of warranty seems to have survived in an attenuated form in 
some personal actions, where a defendant could claim to have 
acted on behalf of a lord, whose aid in the case he then 
solicited but could not compel. This was assimilated with Aid-
prayer, for which see generally Bailey, Cambridge Law Journal 
ix. 82-4 and S.F.C. Milsom, Novae Narrationes (Selden Society 
lxxx 1963), cxlv, cciii. 
21. I have modified the translation of B~Smalley, ~ Study of the 
BiQl~ !Q th~ Middle ~g~~ (2nd ed. Oxford 1952), 118 in the 
interests of legal clarity; compare the Latin text ibid., n. 2. 
The defendants' grantors are to "pro illis stare et 
garantizare", very likely a reference to the common phrase 
68 
"stare ad rectum". This commentary was admittedly written 
(before 1161/3) in France, ibid., 87-8. 
22. EYC ii. 983 (1183/c. 1160). 
23. Pipe Roll Soc. xiv. 22-3 (1194). Cf. J.Prawer, Crusading 
Institutions (Oxford 1982), 415, 427. 
24. This need not be in court. References to the ''warrant'' of the 
king or others for some money payment are common in royal 
records, e.g. Pipe Roll 15 Henry 11, 23, 110 (1169). 
25. Pollock. and Maitland, i. 59 saw chattel warranty references as 
"interesting by their analogy to the doctrine of warranty in the 
law of real property". 
26. I discuss some of these as they effect land title in twelfth and 
thirteemth century England in my paper "The emergence of the 
flat-arsed conveyancer in medieval England". 
27. The evidence cited by Pollock and Maitland, ii. 71, n. 2, for 
the existence of the same rule limiting voucher to three 
warrantors is a good indication of this. Cf. also Ducange s. 
vv. Garantus, Garantire and Warantus, iv. 26-7, viii. 403-4; 
J.F. Niermeyer, Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus (Leiden 1976), 
s.v. Warantus, pp. 1128-9; Lexicon Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis 
PolonoI~, ed M. Plezi (Warsaw etc. 1975-7) s. vv. Guarandia, 
Guarantia etc., cols. 646-50; and Liebermann, Gesetze der 
Angelsachsen s. vv. Gewahrburge, Gewahrleisten, ii. 471-2. The 
French literature on warranty is almost non-existent. Not 
figuring among the set topics of feudalism or roman law, 
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warranty is little studied. Thirteenth-century coutumiers 
nevertheless attest to its existence over a wide area. Cf. Le 
conseil de ~ de Fontaines, ed. M.A.J. Marnier (Paris 1846), 
Xv. x, lxix; XXIX. xxiii; XXXII. iv (pp. 113, 148-9, 350, 366-
n; Le !ivres de jostice et de plet, ed. L. Rapetti (Paris 
1850), IX. xv; XII. vi (pp. 177, 232-4); Philippe de Beaumanoir, 
Coutumes de Beauvaisis, ed. A. Salmon (Paris 1899-1900; reissued 
1970), c. 34, esp. sections 998, 1011, 1015 etc. 
28. The evidence noticed to date is northern French. See H. 
Platelle, "Crime et chatiment ii Marchiennes", Sacris ]1:rudiri xxiv 
. " 
(1980), 195-8 for an attempt 1033/48 to produce "tutorem 
legitimum quem vulgo appellant warandum qui hanc rem 
testificaretur" against a rent suit by a lay lord through a 
public court. The monastic landlord merely sent relics, which 
lost the case but induced the oppressor to repent. The account 
is very late eleventh century from near Charleroi, Belgium, 
ibid., 161. In the early 1080s, Robert of Mortain insisted that 
the Norman priory he founded for Marmoutiers remain exclusively 
under his protection, so that he would be "advocatus et ut vulgo 
dicitur garantus eleemosinae meae, sicut laicus homo esse debet 
elemosinae in sua manu retentae". Paris, B;N. Lat. 12878, fos. 
28lv-282v (1060/90, ? early 1080s) A charter of 1153, makes a 
vendor monastery promise Homblieres (nr. St. Quentin) not to 
refuse "tuitionem et quod vulgo dicitur guarandisam" when 
required, Paris B.N. Lat. 13911, fo. 44r-v. I owe my knowledge 
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of the last two texts to Professors Emily Tabuteau and Giles 
Constable respectively, and must also thank Dr. David B~tes for 
advice on dating etc. 
29. Pre-Conquest England lacks documented private land grants of the 
kind thBlt might have included warranty clauses. Normandy, which 
does pos,sess such documentation, lacks evidence of chsttel 
warranty. Clearly, extant documents are an unsafe basis for 
general statements here. However, see below text at ns. 75-89. 
for argu.ment to justify the statement in the text. 
30. S.E. Th~lrne, "Livery of Seisin", 1l!lrl. Quarterly Review [hereafter 
!ru!l 1 ii (936), 345-64. 
31. EYC iv. 91 (1173/4) illustrates the practice at Rielvaux. 
32. Maitland already saw this, Pollock and Maitland, i. 306-7; ii. 
663. See now the acute remarks of E. King, "The Anarchy of 
Stephen's Reign", TRHS 5th s. xxxiv (1984), esp. 138-9. English 
historians ought to consult the excellent recent studies on 
forms of protection in various regions of France by P. Duparc. 
See in particular his "Le tensement", Rev. his!"," de droit 
francais: ~ etranger 4e s. xi (I 962), 42-63, which reveals the 
context of the word tenserie in Anglo-Saxon Chronicle s.a. 1137. 
Also id., "La commendise ou commende personelle", Bull. ~ 
des chartes cxix (1961), 50-112, "Le sauvement " , Bull. 
philologigue ~ hist. du comite des travaux historigues ~ 
scientifigues (1961), 389-433 and "Libres et hommes liges", 
Journal des ~ (1973), 81-98. Little comparable has been 
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attempted in England since the classic controversy over 
commendation in Domesday Bbok cursorily summarised in my book 
King. Lords and Peasants in Medieval England (Oxford 1980), 237-
9. There is, however, suggestive material from one area in R. 
Stewart-Brown, "The avowries of Cheshire", EHR xxix (914), 41-
55 and G. Barraclough, "Some chsrters of the Earls of Chester", 
in Pipe roll society n.s. xxxvi for 1960 (1962), 25-43, esp. 
nos. 7-9, pp. 35-7. 
33. For references to the litersture on this, see my ~ Lords and 
Pessants, 261, n. 158. 
34. 9gg v. 77-9 (1207) is a good example, for whose circumstances 
see EYC xi, pp. 187-90 etc. and C. T. Flower, Introduction to 
the Curia Regis Rolls. 1199-1230 A.D. (Selden Society lxii 
1943), 133-4, 217. Quite a body of material reflects the 
situation when a tenant quarrels with his lord or finds he is 
saddled with an old enemy as his new lord, and so seeks the 
protection of an overlord by direct homage. 
35. EYC iii. 31 (1138/47) Warenne to Nostell, a protection almost 
regal in its range of formulas; EYC viii. 1510 (1177/c. 1185). 
This is a familisr theme of royal protections, EYC iii. 1363 
(1181), 1462 (1170/85) v. 240 (11181). 
36. EYC i. 164 (1160/5) to Rielvaux, a renunciation of false 
boundaries to which ix. 157 = Greenway, Charters of the Honor of 
~~QX!Y, no. 247 supplies the context; §Xf v. 389 (c. 1155/77). 
37. §Xf viii. 34-5 (1147, after 1138) both Warenne to Lewes are good 
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examples. Also v. 222, 347 (c. 1155/84, 1115/33) to St. Mary's, 
York. Clauses of this kind are usually phrased in the first 
person. The drafting choice between such words as "oro", 
IIvolo lI , "rogo" or "precipio" is noteworthy. 
38. Greenway no. 351 (c. 1147/57): "quia non est michi amicus qui 
inde cOlltumeliam fecerit"; ibid. no. 313 (c. 1170/86). 
39. See the borrowed Frankish form of hold-oath (fealty) in W. 
Stubbs, Select Charters (9th edn. H. W. C. Davis, Oxford 1913), 
73-4, 78 and cf. Glanvill ix. 1 (ed. Hall, 104). 
40. EYC iii. 1352 (l150/c. 1160) records a life grant graciously 
accepted by William, earl of Aumale "pro adjutorio meo et 
manutenemento meo". 
41. EYC ii. 1012 (c. 1126/9): "volo ... ut heredes mei manuteneant et 
defendallt eam ubique et contra omnes homines"; cf. also iv. 10 
(c. 1135), 86 (1205/11212). 
42. EYC ix. 125, 151 = Greenway nos. 243, 236 (1154/7, 1154) are the 
earliest ones noted. Also EYC iii. 1559 (1200/20); x. 111 
(1210/20). 
43. EYC xii. 74-6 (1143/54). I guess that the grantor may have hd a 
hand in drafting these documents, which go well beyond the 
normal Nostell style. See ibid., pp. 97-9 for information about 
his lands. The group of documents have interesting implications 
for those interested in the location of "ownership" at this 
date. ~nportant questions of tenurial definition and the 
responsibility for forinsec service were not clarified in 
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writing until the confirmation by Osbert's son Ralph, ibid. 79 
(1154/63). 
44. Pollock and Maitland, i. 306-7. 
45. Kirkstall Abbey was assured by EYC iii. 1655 (c.1160/75) that it 
would receive another two carucates in the event of inability to 
maintain the original grant. This has the air of an express 
provision necessitated by the terms of the agreement, not a 
standard formula, as in warranty. Cf. EYC viii. 45 (1138/47): 
Ilpro posse suo". 
46. Hn., 57. 8 (ed. Downer, 17 8). 
47. Bailey, Cambridge Law Journal ix. 203 suggests that this is the 
origin of "advocatio" = advowson. This would take the argument 
back at least to Constitutions of Clarendon 1164, c.l. Landau, 
Jus Patronatus, 9-10, n. 32 also thought that the usage started 
in mid-twelfth century England. 
48. Paul Brand suggests a different distinction. He points out that 
an incumbent clerk was calling upon, not his grantor and 
predecessor-in-title (or representative therof) as in ordinary 
warranty, but a patron with a mere right of presentation. The 
patron and the clerk claimed two quite distinct interests in the 
"property". No patron could be expected to warrant the 
possession of a church. The best a clerk could do was to avow 
that this patron had presented him and let the patron establish 
his title or lose it. 
49. Lords as "owners": S.E. Thorne, "English feudalism and estates 
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in land", Cambridge Law journal xvii (959), S.F.C. Milsom, in 
his introduction to Pollock and Maitland, The history of English 
Law (Cambridge 1968 reissue), i. 1xxxv. For Advowry, Bee above 
n. 32. 
50. J. Yver, "Autour de l' absence d' avouerie en Normandie", 57 
~H!l~lin de la societe ~~§ antiquaires ~~ Normandie (1963-4), 
189-270; E. Tabuteau, "Transfer of Property in Eleventh-Century 
Norman Law", 803-4. 
51. Both references noticed concern the king. REX v. MALKAEL 
(Appendi.x II) seems to stem from royal action to resume land 
from the supporter of a dispossessed rebel. By EYC iii. 1420 
(1102/ c.1114) Henry I granted to Robert de Lacy lands '~uas 
idem Rex de Willelmo de Say avoabat", according to W.C. 
Wightman, The Lacy Family in England and Normandy. 1066 - 1194, 
(Oxford, 1966), 36-7, a reference to a banishment. In the Welsh 
Marches and Ireland, "advocaria" denoted in the thirteenth 
century lordship over men without landholdings. Dr. Brand also 
points out that in a thirteenth-century action for Customs and 
Services the defendant could disavow holding of his plaintiff, 
and thus force him into an action of right. 
52. Hn., 10" 3, 75. 7a; cf. ibid., 43. 3, 85. 1 • See also J. Wuest, 
Die Leis Willelme (Romanica Helvetica lxxix, Berne 1969), 98. 
53. See the translation of II Cn., 23, 24. I in Liebermann, Gesetze, 
i. 327 and the latin translation of II Atr., 8 sq. in 
Quadripartitus, Gesetze, i. 224 sq. 
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54. ~YC xi. 123 (c. 1140/50) and x. 88 (1151/6) are the earliest 
noticed. Also ii. 1202 = xi. 10 (before 1160); xi. 274 (c. 
1170/93); xii. 69 (before 1181); ii. 766, 1078 (1180/90). 
55. References to monastic advocates are not unusual in England. 
Yorkshire examples are EYC viii. 17 (1118/30); iii. 1468 
(1135/7); ii. 952 (1153/7); x. 105 (1180); xi .50 (1189). The 
point seems to have been to single out founders and others with 
similar duties; see Clay, EYC x, p. xvii and n.1. 
56. I discuss this "negative" aspect of warranty further in my paper 
on "The Emergence of the Flat-arsed Conveyancer". Legal 
historians refer to it as the "homage bar", on which see bel-ow, 
text at n. 126. 
57. See below text at ns. 112 sq. for tenants previously seised, who 
naturally affected warranties of new grantees. 
58. In practice this was mostly a matter of the probsbility of 
continued, untroubled tenure. One might wish to say that great 
churches armed with a string of royal and papal privileges had 
greater "right" than mere laymen. 
59. The writs they used are discussed in Appendix I. 
60. Milsom, Legal Framework, 80 sq. 
61. CRR i. 283, 295, 341 (1200) is one good illustration; Appendix I 
has others. 
62. Bailey, Cambridge Law Journal ix. 196, 201-2; D.W. Sutherland, 
The Assize of Novel Disseisin (Oxford 1973), 19-20, 37,42, 131, 
218-9. The fact that leases might contain express warranty is 
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another indication that the institution was not seignorial in 
origin. 
63. One would expect the same to be true of tenants in free alms. 
64. In contrast, R.C. Palmer, "The Feudal Framework of English Law", 
Michigan L.R. lxxix (1981), 1149, 1153 sees the settlement 
of 1153 as investing tenants with a "germ of ownership" for the 
first time. Further discussion in Appendix III below. 
65. It is hard to formulate this without anachronistic invocation of 
the common-law tenures. I have in mind some hypothetically' 
"normal" terms of lasting, honourable and non-servile tenure. 
66. F.M. Stenton, The First Century of English Feudalism (2nd ed. 
Oxford 1961), 38-41, 260-1 gives one example. 
67. See below text at ns. 161 sq. for the role of Church draftsmen 
in establishing the practice of express clauses. 
68. See below at n. 186 for some comment on the strict construction 
involved. 
69. Bailey, CLJ viii. 279-85 and ix. 193-7. 
70. Canon lawyers could no doubt have chosen a very difficult kind 
of security device from roman law formulas. 
71. Cf. above at n. 28. 
72. ~~~ i. 265 iv. 118 (c.1137/61), the earliest Yorkshire example 
comes from St. Mary's, York and contains the house's exchange 
exclusion. Cf. also viii. III (1159/64), which is patently 
anything but common form; iii. 1405 (1160/c.1170); vi. 156 
(1166/82). Chronicon Abbatie Rameseiensis, ed. W.D. Macray (R.S. 
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1886), 273, 274-6, both probably from the 1130s, suggest that 
Ramsey too assumed a normal obligation to warrant by this time. 
Tabuteau cites a Pre.aux charter of 1101/6 that similarly assumes 
exchange as the normal case by excluding it in this instance. 
73. Early examples from EYC are i. 372 (1130/8); viii. 42,113 
(1138/47,before 1152). iv. 12 (1136/45) is a probable example; 
ii. 1223 (c.1130/9) a possible one. A. Sa1tman, Theobald, 
Archbishop of Canterbury (London 1956), 537-8, a narrative 
relating a warranty demand of 1146, has both parties using the 
language of voluntary requests; Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum 
iii, ed. H.A. Cronne and R.H.C. Davis (Oxford 1968) [hereaf~er 
Regesta iiil, no. 150 is Stephen's conformation of the eventual 
excahnge. From the 1160s one finds exchanges which can be 
related to their original failed grant, e.g. vi. 140, 154 
(1166/74, 1166/94) and iii. 1501, 1624 (1147/54, 1185/93). It is 
necessary to exclude references to exchange for such reasons 8S 
economic convenience (ii. 1257), or compensation to a doweress 
for a grant of her dower land (ii. 1250) or when evicting 
unwanted tenants (i. 250, 1049 of 1154/7 and 1155/63 ). The last 
case is not perhaps irrelevant to the matter in hand. 
74. The earliest examples are from the abbacy of 1122/c.1137, EYC i. 
310 (on which cf. J .L. Barton, "The rise of the fee simple", ill..!! 
xcii, 1976, 112); iii. 1303. EYC i. 264 suggests that the 
exclusion applied to all the abbey's "franci tenentes" in the 
area. Other examples in EYC are i. 369; ii. 1168 (Btidlington 
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1188/95, 1175/85) and iii. 1685 (Watton 11ate twelfth century). 
75. What follows constitutes a personal interpretation of the 
arguments and material collected in a draft chapter (Cap. Iv: 
"Modes of assurance: warranty") of Emily Tabuteau's forthcoming 
book on Normandy. 1 have not seen her argument in its final 
form. 
76. Fauroux, no. 159 (1061/3) is an excellent case to point. 
77. Below at ns. 112 sq. 
M78. Tabuteau quotes this charter in her book draft but unfortunately 
did not give the full reference. 
79. See above n. 74 for St. Mary's systematic exclusion of exchanges 
from the 1127/36 abbacy, the preceding text for the first 
smattering of express warranty clauses and below Appendix I for 
writs on the 1130 Pipe Roll that apparently offer royal 
assistance in the enforcement of a claim to exchange on default 
of warranty. 
80. DB', i. 204d. 
81. DBj i. 62b is typical. 
82. eg DB~ i. l48d. 
83. DB', i. 135b is s good illustration; see F.E. Harmer, Anglo-Ssxon 
Writs (Manchester 1952), 310-11, 356-7 (no. 91) for the way 
Westminster Abbey may have touched up their evidence (8 writ 
confirming 8 pre-Conquest privste grant) to persuade the king to 
back them up. Also !!!l~ i. 141c. 
84. In,!ill, i. 137d a protector is vouched to justify tenure against 
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the king himself; the plea succeeded, VCH, Herts., iii. 63. See 
also DB~ i. 141d-142a. 
85. Cf. l?~~ i. 220c, 225d. 
86. DB~ iv. 480 = f. 516b (Liber Exon.): tenant "invocat eum (the 
lord) ad guarant. Sed (the lord) inde omnino deficit ab illo die 
quo Rex W. nunc (the tenant) de ipsa terra resaisire fecit." Cf. 
also DB, i. 49d, 56b. 
87. DB~ i. la: townsmen "revocant (Odo of Bayeux) ad protectorem et 
liberatorem vel datorem", last two words interlined; DB~ i. 
227c: claims the king as advocate; DB~ i. 249b: "se defensorem 
fac it" against the king; DB~ i. 276c: avows the king as prote<,:tor 
but Henry de Ferrars as liberator. 
88. See above for DB~ iv. 480. Also DBi i. 238c, 244c (Flecknoe, 
Warwicks. ). 
89. Fauroux, no. 113 (1043/8) is a nice illustration both of an 
early guarantee/confirmation by a great lord and of the further 
recourse to the ducal court as to a higher -- but still private 
-- power. See David Bates, "The Earliest Norman Writs", EHR c 
(1985), 266-84. 
90. Milsom, LF, 174. 
91. Milsom, LF, 8 was unduly pessimistic on prospects of knowing his 
seignorial world. Charters record something of both normality 
and the disputes on its breakdown. 
92. S.D. White'.s unpublished paper, "Legal Argument and Claims to 
Inheritances in Western French Courts" (above n. 7) shows how 
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complex the patterns of dispute resolution were in Western 
France. His argument must serve as a warning for English 
historians. even though English courts may have been 
precociously dominant because of the absence of private war etc. 
93. Further consideration of this assumption. often unjustified. 
comes below. 
94. Milsom. LF. 40 "Seisin itself connotes ••• that seignorial 
acceptance which is all the title there can be." 
95. See above n. 73 for exchanges made after warranties had failed. 
Earl RiChard de Clare's mandate of 11173. printed by Stenton, 
Th~ first Centur~ ~1 ~~glish Feudalism (2nd ed. Oxford 1961), 
270, refers to a comparable inquiry (into rei veritas) made dab 
antiquioribus hominibus meis" but characteristically fails to 
expand on the details. 
96. The Prior of Spalding paid 5 m. in 1212 for his writ in SPALDING 
v BICKER (Appendix II). 
97. Milsom, LF. 47-50; cf. ibid •• 47 for these cases. 
98. Milsom, LF, 49. 52-4, 93. 
99. PKJ iii. 2007; CRR iv. 101-2, 198 (1206) is one example, whose 
background is clarified by Pipe Roll 2 John, 113; Rot. de ~ ~ 
Fin., 219 (1204). SPALDING v BICKER (Appendix II) is another. 
100. SUDBURY v CLARE (Appendix II). 
101. See above at n. 59 for the use of suits about warranty or homage 
as an alternative to upward claims by writ of right patent. 
102. The text strictly holds only for disputes between the original 
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parties to a grant. Most disputes came when one or both were 
dead. 
103. But see Thorne, "Livery of Seisin", !Q..g lii (1936). 352. 
104. Milsom, 1&, 125, n. 2, 128, n. 2 cites some relevant cases. 
105. For attitudes towards charters in the royal courts at the time 
of the earliest plea rolls, see Milsom LF, 63, 89 and the cases 
there cited. 
106. W.J.M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science (Harmondsworth 
1967), Cap. 9 (b), esp. 126-7 intriguingly hints at an early 
Games-Theory approach to the politics of an almost contemorary 
society through saga literature. 
107. See on this F.L. Cheyette, "Suum Cuique Tribuere", French 
Historical Studies< vi (1970), 287-99 and, for some general 
thoughts on trial procedure, my own "Henry II and Ganelon", The 
Syracuse Scholar (1983), 23-35. 
108. Cf. J. Le Goff, Pour £Q ~ moyen ~ (Paris 1977), 349-420 on 
the associated ritual of Investiture. Of course, many grants 
were unaccompanied by homage. Livery of seisin, which must have 
been equally important, needs fresh Btudy from this point of 
view. 
109. For the model that justifies this very summary account of battle 
see my "Trial by Ordeal: the Key to Proof in the Early Common 
Law", Of the Laws and Customs of England: Essays in fuillQ.r of 
Samuel ~ Thorne, ed. M.S. Arnold et al. ( Chapel Hill, N.C. 
1981), 90-126. 
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110. White, "Legal Argument and Claims to Inheritances", suggests 
lapse of time before making a claim (prescription or negligence) 
and estoppel by quit-claim as possibly decisive arguments. 
111. Glanyill., iii. 7, cited Milsom, LF, 77. ~ Roll 24 Henry 11, 
72 may well echo this procedure. The sheriff accounts for 8/-
which AI'nald f. Cliebern had offered to Robert f. Azo "pro 
servitio cujusdam terre quos (denarios) idem Azo noluit 
accipere". I conjecture that Arnald offered his service on 
Robert' 8 accession to his father',s lordship and on refusal 
deposited it with the sheriff against a future royal lawsuit. 
112. I exclude from consideration here cases where two claimants seek 
to hold of two different lords, which could lead to a straight 
fight between the maintaining lords over the lordship. Cf. 
Glanyill iii. 6-8 (ed. Hall, 41-3) and Appendix I. 
113. GODRIC OF SKEEBY'S CASE (Appendix II) is one example that 
happens to be relatively clear and almost certainly from the 
period before 1166 and novel disseisin. 
114. Milsom, LF, 61, 75. R.C. Palmer, "Feudal Framework", Michigan 
Law review lxxix (1981), 1136, 1141-2, 1145 seemed to go beyond 
Milsom (e.g. LF, 42). Professor Palmer has since explained his 
views to me by letter. He distinguishes between elder sons 
returning, say, from crusade and those ("strangers") claiming 
through a title distinct from the sitting tenant's. His 
conclusion, that "before 1176 decisions were discretionary 
••• not by rules of law that would compel a lord at times to 
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make an inappropriate choice" but by "a complex calculus of 
factors ••• astronomically higher" for a stranger thsn for a 
returning elder brother, seems quite close to the present 
argument. I am grateful to him for access to a typescript draft 
of his recent article "The Origins of Property in England", Law 
~nd ~istory Review, iii (1985), I-50, the first section of which 
is particularly relevant here. 
115. Clear cases of this are very hard to find, especially for the 
period before private charters become common. One suspects that 
many charters were drawn up after suits where a lord's accepted 
tenant was genuinely at risk or had even lost his land. 
Draftsmen had no interest in recording that someone else had 
once claimed to have "maius ius" than his grantee, though 
express warranty clauses do sometimes specify the likely 
claimant; see below at n. 166. GODRIC OF SKEEBY'S CASE (Appendix 
II) despite its unusual documentation, is still not entirely 
clear. One can only point to likely examples. Eye ix. 124 
(?1147/57) seems to result from a suit in Roger de Mowbray's 
court by Rielvaux abbey. EYC v. 245 (1155/68) resulted from a 
younger brother's suit by writ in the court of a lord who had 
recently released Easby abbey from the obligation to pay relief 
on this land "nisi alius eam acquirat qui majus ius in ea 
habeat" (ibid. 243 unhelpfully dated by the editor 1155/95). 
EYC iv. 3 (1156/8) is a confirmation by Earl Conan of Richmond 
which assumes that the grantee, Kirkstall abbey, will hear 
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actions by writ (including "breve de recto") against tenants in 
the vilL Quitclaim charters have a particularly powerful claim 
to consideration. EYC xi. 231 (c.1160/75) records one made in 
the court of William de Percy. I guess that Sallay had on the 
basis of ibid. 14 (c.1147/54) sued Robert Coc, who as the man in 
possession and perhaps a Percy servant had unsuccessfully sought 
his lord~s warranty. Other readings are possible. 
116. Pipe Roll 11 ~ 1, 112: 105 m. "pro placito duelii inter eum 
et hominem suum"; Cf. Pipe Roll 11 Henry il, 102, 122 and 
perhaps ~ !2ll 26 Henry il, 29. Also Milsom. LF, 84-5. 
117. See bellOw at ns. 168 sq. 
118. Earldom of Gloucester Charters, ed. R.B~ Patterson (Oxford 
1973), no. 186 records an interesting Norman case dated c. 
1155/62. 
119. My pupil John Hudson suggest that some of the charter quit-
claims cf tenants to their lords represent extracurial action by 
the lord to rearrange "his" lands without the need to make a 
full exchange. 
120. I discuss the chronology of these changes below. 
121. See Appendix I, n. 15. 
122. LHP, 10. 1; Glanvill, xii. I, 6-9, on which see N.D. Hurnard, 
"Magna Carta, clause 34" in Studies in Medieval History.!..!..!. to 
F.M. Powicke, ed. R.W. Hunt et al. (Oxford 1948), esp. 161-2, 
168, 178-9. See further on Tolt n. 161 below. J. Campbell, "The 
Significance of the Anglo-Norman State in the Administrative 
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History of Western Europe", Francia ix (1980), 117-34 makes s 
powerful case for raising previous estimates of royal writ 
production from Henry I's reign, and indeed back into the 
eleventh century. 
123. The viscontiel writs in R.C. van Caenegem, Royal Writs from the 
Conquest 12 Glanvill (Selden Soc. lxxx 1961), nos. 1-2, 5-7, 9-
10, 14, 18 and Section IX (nos. 130-58) passim, have been 
curiously neglected. Such writs appear to peter out early in 
Henry II's reign, no doubt because of newer forms. Cf. Glanvill, 
vii. 7; ix. 9, 14; xii. 12-14, 16-17, 20. 
124. Hurnard, "Magna Carta, clause 34", 160 is one of the few to ,pay 
attention to the overlord. Glanyill, xii. 8 suggests that one 
could get a writ of right addressed to an overlord. Cf. also 
above n. 31 for a late illustration of tenants bypassing their 
immediate lord. Advice from one',s own lord to receive homage 
from a particular claimant, perhaps in the overlord~s court as 
in EYC v. 309 (c. 1180/9), was not easily resisted. See also in 
this connection Chronicon Abbatie Rameseiensis, 274-7, 318-9. 
125. Bailey, "Warranties of Land in the Reign of Richard I", CW ix 
(1945-7), 197-8. 
126. S. E. Thorne, "English Feudal ism and Estates in Land", CW 
(959). 
127. Thorne, "English Feudalism and Estates in Land", 193, n. Since 
his lectures remain unpublished, we are left with charter 
references from "easily accessible books" only. 
128. Cf. J .C. Holt, "Politics and Property in Early Medieval 
England", Past and f!:.!lunt Ivii (1972). 
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129. Palmer, "The Origins of Property" takes a position not 
dissimilar in principle to that argued here, though our 
different usage of words like "rules" may obscure this. My 
choice of a more gradualist line here was consciously reaffirmed 
against a recent reading of the impressive warnings of Stephen 
Jay Gould, ~ Panda's Thumb (1980), caps. 17-9. 
130. See my "The Emergence of the Flat Arsed Conveyancer in Medieval 
England." 
131. The rest of this paragraph depends heavily on S.D. White, whose 
forthcoming book Cuatom. Kinship and Gifts 12 Saints will 
clarify the Laudatio Parentum and much else. The argument in the 
text is thus rather provisional. 
132. Hilsom, LF, cap. I~ cites many of the cases. 
133. See P. Ourliac and J. de Ha1afosse, Histo~ du droit prive ii 
(2nd ed. Paris 1971), 424-5. 
134. Glanyill, vii. 2 (ed. Hall, 74). The fact that heirs still tried 
to challenge their ancestors' grants illustrates the popular 
feeling that the heir~8 interest predated the ancestor's death. 
I hope to discuss elsewhere the implications of 
"rationabi1iter", with which Henry II qualified all free alms 
grants and confirmations from 1155 onwards. EYC i. 76 is an 
early example; see also Yver, art. cit., 793. In 1202, Geoffrey 
f. Peter required a special privilege, Rot. Chart., 79, to get 
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the rule waived in his favour. The innovation seems to have been 
a learned import to English law via the canonical prohibitions 
on the alienation of ecclesiastical lands. 
135. Milsom, LF, 86-7. 
136. Ibid., 85 snd n.4. A case of 1194, RCR i. 64-5 cited Bailey, CLJ 
ix, 199, cornea close to rejecting the Glanvillian doctrine and 
enforcing a deathbed grant even though seisin did not pass. 
137. See my "The Common Law and the French Connection", 81-4. 
138. Thorne, "Livery of Seisin", 356-63 is Milsomian avant l! lettrel 
He demonstrates, pp. 353-6, that mere symbolic delivery had 
prevailed earlier in the century. 
139. I discuss Glanyill, x. 8, 18 in my paper "The Emergence of the 
Flat-arsed Conveyancer in Medieval England". 
140. The fact, as I believe, of beneficiary drafting in most charters 
should restrain any simple attempts to deduce the grantor',s 
intention from their wording. It is hard to distinguish between 
what (ecclesiastical) draftsmen persuaded lay donors to "want", 
what the customary formulas wanted them to want, and what they 
did want. The formulas remain an invaluable guide to donors'. 
practice, but not to their original aspirations. 
141. Some like Eye i. 619 (1161) were leases. In i. 511 (1171/2) the 
warranty may have been limited to non-heritable land. The 
grantor of v. 398 (1146/58) was an archdeacon who may have been 
unwilling to bind his heirs, though a canon of Drax, who omitted 
any reference to his own obligations (no doubt because as a monk 
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he was civilly dead) took care to commit his heirs expressly. 
Not all can be explained away. I have at present no explanation 
for ~Xf i. 11 (1171/2) to a single grantee or ibid. x. 43 
(c.1194). See also GODRIC OF SKEEBY'S CASE (Appendix II). One 
should naturally exclude from consideration here charters 
recording actual performance of warranty. Examples may include 
viii. 80 (1164/86) and Greenway, no.179 (1173/84), probably to 
be connected with no.178 (1161/9) and cf. ibid., p.182. 
142. EYC viii. 42 0138/47); xi. 21 0156/75); iv. 38 (1156/11162); 
v. 228-9 (1165/74,11174); iii. 1868 (1185/1200). Royal acts may 
be diffl!rent; see for example Delisle and Berger, Receuil des 
actes d"Henri n, i, no. 60 (1155/8). 
143. A few charters appear to mix a personal promise with a later 
clause binding heirs. Cf. xi. 193 (c.1145/70); Greenway,no. 264 
(1154/86) which may be forged; EYC i. 623 (c.1180/90). 
144. Hilsom, LF, 42 remarks dismissively that this "may mean no more 
than that the authority is to be renewed on each change of 
parties". 
145. Cf. EYC i. 277 (1175/95) whose carefully drafted warranty clause 
specifies that "quicumque in hereditatem meam succederint" were 
to warrant these alms. 
146. S.D. White and J.C. Holt take differing views of a small number 
of grants "to X and his (singular) heir" in Past and Present lxv 
(1974), 119-20, 130-2. 
147. Glanvill ix. 4 (ed. Hall, 107). 
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148. J .C.Holt, "Politics and Property in Early Medieval England", 
Past and Present Lvii (1972), 12 sq. reminded students of the 
continuing importance within English custom into Glanvill ',s time 
of the "French" distinction between "acquets" and "heritage", 
Further references in my "French Connection", 87-8. 
149. The missing element might be s reference to relief. The lord'.s 
acceptance of a tenant's heir was still far from automatic in 
Glanvill's day. There was no obligation to receive an heir'.s 
homage until arrangement had been made for the payment of 
relief. I take it that the use in the text here of dominus 
rather than donator etc. reflects the seignorial context. 
150. England is unlikely to have lagged for behind Normandy, for 
which see J. Yver, "Une boutade de Guillaume le conquerant; note 
sur la genese de la tenure en aumone", Etudes Q... Le .!l.!H (Paris 
1965), ii. 783-96, a study that needs replicating from English 
evidence. 
151. F.M. Stenton, The First Century of English Feudalism (2nd ed. 
Oxford 1961), 38-40, 260-1. 
152. Lay grants for little or no consideration, such as the important 
grant in frankmariage, were as open to this objection as grants 
to religion. 
153. Cf. Thorne, "English Feudalism and Estates in Land", 205-6 and 
above at ns. 95 sq. 
154. J.C. Holt's evolving view from Past and Present Ivii (1972) to 
his "Feudal Society and the Family in Early Medieval England; 
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Notions of Patrimony", TRHS 5th s. xxxiii (1983), 193-220 msy 
fairly be juxtaposed with Thorne, "English Feudalism and Estates 
in Land". White. "Succession to Fiefs in Early Medieval 
England". Past and Present Lxv (974). 118-27 or Milsom. LF. Cf. 
also R. DeAragon. "The Growth of Secure Inheritance in Anglo-
Norman England", Journal of Medieyal History viii (982), 381-
91. 
155. Below Appendix I, n. 15. 
156. What follows is of necessity impressionistic. There is no way to 
read or count lost documents, still less grants that never 
reached writing. 
157. Above at ns. 72-88. 
158. For St. Marys, York, see above n. 74. EYC i. 36 (1154/63) is 
from the archiepiscopal neighbour at St. Peter'.s. 
159. EYC viii. III (1159/64); iii. 1405 (1160/c.1l70); vi. 156 
0166/82); iii. 1569 0170/7); iii. 1638 0170/80). Express 
clauses also appear in leases at about this time, EYC ii. 754 
(1160); i. 619 (1161). Both of these limit the obligation to the 
original. lessor and lessee, where later forms are closer to the 
full heritable warranty of grants in fee; cf. ibid., ii. 763, 
789 (1188, 1205). Cf. also Registrum Antiguissimum vi, ed. K. 
Major (Lines. Rec. Soc. xli, 1950), 1935-6 (c. 1160, c. 
1160/70). 
160. F.M.Stenton, Transcripts of Charters.!..!. 1.Q Gilbertine Houses 
(Lines. Record Society xviii, 1922), xxviii sq. the most quoted 
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authority, points to the end of the century, but notes that it 
was already unusual in his sample to find a grant to religion 
without such a clause after the early years of Henry II. Cf. 
also C.Holdsworth, Rufford Charters i (Thoro ton Soc. xxix, 
1972), lxii etc. 
161. This is the most obvious reason why the argument that follows 
does not apply to lay grants in frankmarriage, also often made 
for no service. Frankmarriage charters are rarer than the 
importance of keeping a precise record of so anomalous a 
transaction would lead one to expect and contain express 
warranty clauses no more often than ordinary grants in fee. ,EYC 
v. 262 (c.1175); iii. 1654 (c.1190/1205) and xi. 213 (late 12th 
cent.) are early examples. EYC xi. 215 (1148/56) an heir',s 
confirmation of such a grant that might have been expected to 
make the warranty express did not do so. See further Bailey, CLl 
ix, 197. 
162. See above at n. III for Glanvill on this, and note voucher on 
the basis of homage and services performed continued to be 
legitimate without charter into the thirteenth century, Bracton, 
f. 382 (iv. 195-6). 
163. Similar caution is evident in the recital of consent by a 
grantor',s vassals, according to Thorne, "English Feudalism and 
Estates in Land", 204-5. 
164. But the writing capability of lay magnates was more recent. See, 
for example, Patterson, Earldom of Gloucester Charters, 9 sq. 
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Legal history stands to gain greatly from a proper diplomatic 
study of twelfth-century drafting practice. 
165. E. Tabuteau, "Transfer of Property in ••• Norman Law", 812-4 
suggests that Normandy saw the same development. 
166. See GODRIC OF SKEEBY'S CASE (Appendix II). Another very 
interesting example is Ea!1Y Charters of ~ Paul's Cathedral, 
ed. M. Gibbs (Camden Soc. 3rd s. lviii, 1939), 243 (1180/6), 
which should be read with ibid., 166, 171. 
167. Grantors given their head might have sought to fob off a worried 
grantee with a promise of warranty limited to the anticipated 
troublemaker. I have not yet seen any clauses of this kind. The 
clauses excluding the right to exchange, mentioned above, 
amount to something very similar by creating grants incomplete 
in the Glanvillian sense and not carrying full warranty. Those 
from St. Mary'~s York, at least, were emphatically not 
beneficiary-drafted. 
168. The level of royal intervention may also have been quite high 
for a time in Henry I's reign. 
169. Milsom, LF, 178 first pointed out the importance of the 1153 
settlement to legal history. R.C. Palmer took his suggestions 
further in two clever papers, containing much else besides, 
Michigan Law Review, "Feudal Framework", lxxix (1981) 1135-6, 
1142-5 and "The Origins of Property", esp. 8 sq. In what follows 
I lean heavily on Cap. I of G.J. White, "The Restoration of 
Order ill England, 1153-1165" (Cambridge Ph. D. Thesis, 1974), 
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kindly lent me by the author. 
170. 1 survey the evidence and arguments for this hypothesis in 
Appendix Ill. 
171. Milsom, LF, 178. 
172. Mary Cheney, in "A Decree of King Henry 11 on Defect of 
Justice", in Tradition and Change: Essays in ~ of Marjorie 
Chibn@ll ~, ed. D. Greenway, C. Holdsworth and J. Sayers 
(Cambridge 1985), esp. 184 and "The Litigation between John 
Marshall and Archbishop Thomas Becket in 1164: A Pointer to the 
Origin of Novel Disseisin?", in 1mt and Social Change .in British 
Histo[y, ed. J.A. Guy and H.G. Beale (London 1984), 23-4 
assembles a good case for a high level of royal activity in the 
first years. The estimate of T.A.M. Bishop Scriptores Regis 
(Oxford 1961), 30-1 that as many as 40% of Henry',s whole output 
of known acta come from the first 7 years is probably on the low 
side for the English acta alone. Henry employed more scribes 
during these years than at any other time in the century. Of 
course, it was normal for kings to make a disproportionate 
number of grants at the start of a reign. 
173. See King, "The Anarchy of Stephen',s Reign", TRHS (1984), 145. 
The Chronicle of Battle ~, ed. E. Searle (Oxford 1980), 152-
6 affords a vivid glimpse of the time. 
174. The fact that representatives of English families pursuing some 
very old claims (see Appendix Ill, n. 10 below) were among their 
number suggests that many lost grants went to many besides 
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tenants-in-chief. 
175. Contemporaries may have considered a claim to lands covered by a 
confirmation as a plea of the crown. See the interesting 
suggestions of A. Harding, "The Medieval brieves of protection 
and the Development of the Common Law", Juridical Review (966). 
Royal confirmations indisputably took the tenurial relations 
they covered out of the realm of the privata convencio; cf. 
Gl~il1, x. 8, 18. 
176. Prof, D"W. Sutherland has now relinquished the view expressed in 
his book 1!!g Assize of Novel Disseisin, 7 in the light of The 
~ Qf John Qf Salisbury, i, eds. W.J. Millor, H.E. Butler 
and C.N,L. Brooke (London 1955), no.115. 
177. All interested in the chronology of Angevin legal change must 
take careful account of Palmer, "Origins of Property", esp. 8-
24. 
178. Cheney, "A Decree of King Henry II on Defect of Justice". For 
Tolt's previous limitation to "uncomplicated situations", see 
Palmer, "Feudal Framework", Michigan 1.mi: Review, lxxix (1981), 
1141-2. Appendix III has some further reference to legislation 
at about this time. 
179. Palmer, "Feudal Framework", 1145, n. 22 citing >Ian Csenegem. 
180. Palmer, "The Origins of Property", 13 sq. has recently offered 
some imaginative arguments for this proposition. Not all are 
convincing. For example, "heredes" in the Assize might connote 
all surviving offspring (including those who would only inherit 
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if their older sibs predecease them), rather than heiresses 
alone. And some pre-1176 charters do refer to dower in language 
strongly suggesting tenure from the heir. But these are matters 
of detail to be taken up elsewhere, and it is quite likely that 
other items, such as the invention of the returnable writ, might 
corroborate Palmer',s emphasis on the importance of the Assize of 
1176. 
181. Documentation for this statement and much of the argument in 
the next paragraphs is deferred to Appendix r. 
182. See now Palmer, "Origins of Property", 19-23 and, for Countess 
Amice',B Case, SUDBURY v. CLARE, Appendix II. C.H. Haskins, 
Norman Institutions (New York 1918), 189 noted that the maxim 
was never so broadly recognised in Normandy. 
183. Palmer, "Origins of Property", 22-3 perhaps makes this break a 
little too early and too sharp. The defence goes on into the 
early years of the new century; see the cases cited by Hi1som, 
LF, 14-17, 52-4 and Sutherland, ~ Assize of ~ Disseisin, 
19, 20, n. I, 71, 214. However, the crucial facts were the 
accession in 1199 of a new king with no qualms about making the 
justices sensitive to his wishes and what appears to have been a 
politically inspired precedent (SUDBURY v. CLARE) in the 
required direction. Note that the cases where the justices sent 
an assize dispute back to the lord ',8 court for settlement (e.g. 
PRS xiv. 134; RCR i. 366) are all from Richard',s reign. 
184. See van Caenegem, no. 127 and Appendix 1. 
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185. G1anvil1" ix. 5 (ed. Hall, 109). The possibility that this writ 
was originally framed to meet the situation at the death of a 
tenant ,"'ho had acquired his land in Stephen',s reign and retained 
it under the compromise of 1153 is unfortunately totally 
unsupported by evidence. 
186. Cf. Hilsom, LF, 76-7, 174; Bailey, CLJ viii, 278 sq. and ix, 
193-4. 
187. Cf. Hilsom, LF, 76-7, 101, 120, 130-1, 142, 174, 183. Note that 
this is an unauthorised synthesis. 
188. I say more about this in my "The Emergence of the Flat-Arsed 
Coveyancer in Hedieval England". 
189. The wielding of personal influence can sometimes be documented 
from extra-legal sources, though I have noticed no illustrations 
directly referring to warranty. H.D.Hazeltine, "Judicial 
Discretion at the Time of Henry II", Festschrift Gierke (Weimar 
1911), 1055-1068 usefully summarises Glanvill's testimony, but 
better still would be a study of judges', own litigation. For 
Henry of Whiston, J., see REX v. MALKAEL (Appendix II). The work 
of Dr. Eirand and others on a later period shows that study of 
judicial practice is feasible. 
190. Glanv i 11. , pro!. (ed. Hall, 2-3). With R.V. Turner, The English 
Judiciary in lli ~ of Glanvill and Bracton~ h 1176-1239 
(Cambridge 1985) should be coupled the perceptive survey of P. 
Classen, "Die koniglichen Richter des Common Law: 
Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsstudium ohne Universitat" in his 
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posthumous Studium und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter, ed. J. Fried 
(Stuttgart 1983), 197-237. 
191. C. Donahue, "What causes fundamental legal ideas? Marital 
Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century", 
Michigan ~ ~ lxxviii (1979), 59-88 examines another 
aspect of this transformation by the light of the comparative 
method. I should like, in view of the remarks of R.H. Helmholz, 
Harvard Law Review xcv (1982), 725-6, 733, to repeat here my 
previously stated opinion that the Henrician "shift of control" 
was not the work of an altruistic automaton but resulted from 
persistent conscious legislative experimentation by Henry and 
his advisers. 
192. This is the context for the arguments about the need for "do" 
and "concedo", on which see Bailey, CLJ, viii, 281-2; ix, 195. A 
well-known case of 1194, HURTON v FITZI E~ERARD (Appendix II) is 
a particularly good illustration. 
193. Law and custom at the highest social levels are better assessed 
from political studies such as J.E.A. Jolliffe, Angevin Kingship 
(1955) or J.C.Holt, ~ Northerners (1961) than any works of 
legal history. 
194. For the lord as domestic enemy, see Dialogus ~ Scaccario, ed. 
C. Johnson (corrected ed., Oxford 1983), 101. In my King. Lords 
~ Peasants in Medieval England (1980), cap. 13, I argued that 
common-law villeinage originated in a decision to backtrack from 
a too wide provision of remedies for (free) tenants against 
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their lords. 
195. S.D. White, "Inheritance Cases" indicates SOme of the approach's 
benefits" 
196. There is a wealth of material in the introductions to recent 
volumes of the Pipe Roll Society, especislly those edited by the 
late Lady Stenton. G.D.G. Hall, "The EarlY History of Entry Sur 
Disseisilll", ~ 1.l!!! Review xlii (1968), 584-602 is a model 
for the integration of the different sources in straight 
doctrinal history. Palmer, Michigan Law review Lxxix also makes 
exemplary use of the evidence from financial records. 
197. See particularly Appendix I. van Caenegem, Royal Writs brings 
together a great deal of raw data from the pipe rolls of this 
period. 
198. Most of my own efforts in this direction have so far been 
unproductive. See however Appendix 11: Select Cases. 
199. As Palmer~s witty title to his review essay in Michigan 1.l!!! ~ 
Lxxix implied, Hilsom's book was more concerned with the feudal 
framework of English law than with the actual title of his book! 
This is intentionally my first mention of "feudalism" or its 
derivatives in this paper; all too often feudal terminology seems 
to confuse rather than clarify. One can usually translate "feudal" 
either as "French" (ie a borrowing of forms from abroad) or as 
"concerning lordship". Since the assessment of French borrowings 
and the input of lordship were at the core of the concerns of this 
paper, talk of feudalism would at best have begged important questions. 
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Appendix ~ The ore-history of the action "De Warantia Carte" 
In the developed law of the thirteenth century, the writ "De 
warantia carte" initiated special pleas to compel warranty in a wide 
variety of situations. In the earliest plea rolls, it already appears 
as a discrete action, one of the many weapons in the lawyer's real 
property armoury. At this stage in the 1190s, two forms of "warranty" 
writ existed, one original, the other interlocutory, and litigants had 
the further alternative of an action based on homage. l The pre-history 
of "Warantia carte" and its associates is quite complex. Glanvill's 
treatment (1187/9) of relevant matters may be supplemented by a small 
number of actual writs surviving in contemporary copies and pipe roll 
records of payments for royal assistance in the enforcement of warranty 
and homage. 2 It is thus possible to glimpse how the Common Law 
rationalised the sporadic solicitation of royal assistance by tenants 
under threat into procedures that conformed with the goals of the new 
real actions. 
Glanvill, still the most helpful point of entry, at once throws 
up a difficulty. Only one of the two current forms of "warranty" writ 
appears in his text. The explanation requires SOme examination of his 
Book III, where he discusses a "Breve de Summonendo warsnto".3 Book II 
had dealt with procedure in cases introduced by writ Precipe (i.6) (the 
nascent action of right) where the tenant could make his defence 
without outside help. Book III now groups together three very different 
situations that required the presence in court of a third party. Two he 
details at the onset, those (1) where the tenant claims that the 
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disputed land is not his but belongs to someone else, a lessor for 
example, and (2) where, having admitted that the holding is his, he 
claims right to it by the gift, exchange etc. of a third party.4 A 
third, treated later in the book, is in fact the classic reason for 
acquiring a writ Precipe (i.6), though it can also emerge in actions 
commenced by a Breve de Recto. It arises when the demandant claims to 
hold the disputed tenement from a lord other than the tenant's. This, 
although Glanvill treats it in warranty language, differs from most 
voucher to warranty in that both parties -- not just the tenant -- have 
to seek aid from their "warrantors".5 Neither this nor the first 
situation concerns US here, only voucher to warranty proper. 6 One can 
see why one of Glanvill's earliest readers felt that "De diversis modis 
placitandi" was a better title for Book III than the rubric "De 
diversis warantis" as printed. 7 
Glanvill had to discuss the De Summonendo Waranto, a judicial 
writ (to use an anachronism) for voucher to warranty in the course of 
an action of right. 8 It summoned a warrantor to the aid of a tenant 
himself already Summoned by a Precipe (i.6). The warrantor was to come 
into court (after his due allowance of essoins) either to warrant his 
vouchor and take over the defence, or to explain why he was not bound 
to do so. What was to be done if he did not come looks to have been 
until recently a matter for learned dispute. According to Glanvill, the 
writ's issue lay at the justices' discretion. 9 The author's older 
contemporaries could no doubt remember a time when constraint of a 
warrantor had been regarded as unmannerly or impolitic, when men 
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anticipated that, ideally at least, all concerned parties would owe 
suit to the same lord's court. He justified the constraint "secundum 
ius et consuetudinem regni" on the ground that a warrantor is bound to 
give an exchange for any land lost by his default, an appeal to moral 
obligations predating royal royal intervention. The end result, not 
expressly stated by him probably because it was not yet in existence, 
was the thirteenth-century Cape ad ~alentiam, by which lands of a 
recalcitrant warrantor to the value of the lands currently in dispute 
(in other words a potential "escambium") were taken into the king's 
hand. 10 Such details confirm that we are dealing with a procedure 
subsidiary to real actions touching the right. 
This is the only kind of warranty writ mentioned by Glanvill; 
he says nothing of the later De Warantia Carte, an original writ not 
tied to any other kind of action and using, not the mesne process of 
real actions (Cape etc.), but the quite different process of personal 
actions. Such a writ found no place within the arrangement of the 
treatise, and certainly none within the Books devoted to the writ 
Precipe (1. 6) and the nascent action of right. Glanvill"s silence on 
original warranty writs is to be expected. Yet the demand for an 
original warranty writ had long existed. What was the point of an 
ousted tenant possessing some theoretical right to escambium unless he 
could actually extract this from his warrantor? Threatened tenants were 
not always content to wait and be sued; they might wish to reassure 
themselves about their warranty in advance of trouble. In the absence 
of any evidence that Glanvill's writ of summons was used other than as 
102 
an interlocutory remedy,ll the obvious candidate to fill the gap is the 
De Warantia Carte itself, whose Precipe form is quite congruous with an 
origin early in Henry II's reign. 12 
In Bailey's view, "the available evidence raises an 
irresistible presumption ••• that the writ and action ••• were well 
established before the end of Richard's reign". Known cases took its 
existence back to within a very few years of Glanvill's writing,13 and 
it certainly has the air of an established action well before 1200. 14 
In truth, the king had long been prepared to help draw into a royal 
court for examination, and if necessary constraint, those from whom 
warranty or exchange was claimed. 
A scattering of entries on the 1130 Pipe Roll encourage the 
belief that Henry I could be persuaded for a price to lend his support 
in a claim for warranty or exchange. 1S Of Stephen nothing can be said, 
but writs in Dluch the same Precipe form as the later Warantia Carte go 
back to the beginning of Henry II's reign l6 and are not uncommon 
thereafter,17 being joined by writs of summons (presumably similar to 
those treated by Glanvill and thus interlocutory only) no later than 
1179. 18 Express clauses of warranty, that could go back to the early 
part of the reign, already envisage the possible disturbance of their 
dispositions by the intervention of "vis regia".l9 There is at 
present no way to tell from what date this kind of calculation became 
routine and the writ ceased to be an expensive favour. 20 
The third option was a suit based on homage. Glanvill presents 
the original writ later called De Homagio Capiendo in such a way as to 
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limit its validity to a single specific situation. The writ was only 
available to an heir in possession of a recently deceased ancestor's 
holding but afraid that the lord was about to oust him. The lord, who 
ought normally to take the heir'.s homage "ab inicio" was for some 
reason baulking at the prospect,21 and perhaps considering an inquiry 
into the heir's claim. 22 The proper thing for the heir to do was to 
make frequent offers of relief through respectable intermediaries; this 
constituted his proffer for the reception of his homage. It was 
necessary for the lord to refuse this several times before the heir 
could obtain from the king or a justice a "Precipe" writ to the 
sheriff. 23 
The homage writ presented the defending lord with three 
options. He could acknowledge the justice of the heir's claim, by 
accepting his homage or making firm arrangements to do so;24 he could 
deny the plaintiff's right to succeed as heir; or he could justify his 
hesitation on the ground that the identity of the rightful heir 
remained unclear. 25 Glanvill is not very forthcoming on these and other 
colourable defences. 26 The lord might think himself entitled, by a 
"downward claim", to hold in demesne. In the past, this had frequently 
led to inquiries in the lord's court. Now, however, he needed a writ 
that might lead ultimately to a grand assize. 27 The writ De Homagio 
ensured that royal justices supervised any such "Quo Warranto" inquiry 
in the tenant's interest. 28 It is perhaps not surprising that the writ 
was in Glanvill's day of recent origin,29 and expensive. 30 Its 
certainty of issue ("habebit") and its apparent restriction to a single 
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situation3l distinguish it from the two warranty writs, to which it 
offered little real alternative. 
For all the differences between the origins and early functions 
of the three writs, they provided remedies for overlapping situations 
and some litgants at least could choose which to purchase. In the 
twelfth century, this choice cannot have been determined merely by the 
available proclf. 32 Yet possession of a charter of enfeoffment 
constituted an undeniable advantage. Twelfth-century kings never 
represented themselves as in the business of selling naked power; they 
expected men to show some kind of prima facie case before receiving a 
writ. Many vouchees were of exalted enough status to inspire political 
caution at a time when men still idealized the autonomous "seignorial 
world". The king and his advisers needed some justification before they 
would flout convention by constraining vouchees to warrant. Best was a 
clear charter of the vouchee or an ancestor, which offered a ~ for 
the granting clf a "Precipe" of a kind expressly required by the 
formulas of some writs. 33 In the 1150s charters were too rare to be 
made an absolute requirement. Even Glanvill's writs recite only that 
the vouchor claimed title "de dono" his vouchee or ancestor. 34 All the 
same, writs issued to the charter less probably needed some other 
justification. 35 For the first twenty years of Henry's reign, others 
may not have been able to obtain royal assistance. 36 Pleas of title 
through an unwilling lord must have rung out in many an early Angevin 
courtroom. These were hard cases of the kind that makes bad law. With 
the expansion of real property business in the l170s, royal advisers 
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could hardly ignore them. There would be nothing surprising in their 
turning first to such strong cases as the seised but charter less heir 
and the tenant abandoned far from his lord in a royal action of right. 
Conscious royal decision might thus explain the almost contemporaneous 
arrival of the De Homagio Capiendo (first reference 1178), with its 
highly restricted application and high price, and the discretionary, 
interlocutory "Breve de Summonendo Waranto" (first reference 1179). 
They might even have originated at the same time. 
The thirteenth-century history of warranty writs, including the 
detailed working of Warantia Csrte, is beyond the scope of an appendix. 
In the very long run, the De Homagio Capiendo and the judicial wri't of 
summons survived far into the thirteenth century, despite the apparent 
loss of some business to Warantia Carte. 37 Only their twelfth-century 
pre-history is to the present point. It has revealed that royal 
intervention in warranty disputes ran along rather familiar lines. The 
flow that became Warantia Carte began as favours for the privileged 
few, branched out with experimental remedies for hard cases, and passed 
on into the developed Common Law somewhat swollen with business from 
beyond its original scope. The process of experiment and partial 
rationalisation has parallels elsewhere. Even 80, the best guarantee of 
the essentially unprovable picture sketched here is its congruity with 
the larger one of warranty in general to which it is attached. 
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FOOTNOTES 12 Appendix 1 
1. Hilsom, ~ pp. 128-30, 172-3 and cf. the cases cited 41, n.2, 89, 
n.2. Hilsom's suggestion that suing on wsrranty or homage was at 
the litigant's choice is considered below. Cf. also Hilsom, Novae 
Narrationes (Selden Soc. lxxx), clviii sq. 
2. Both these supplementary sources suffer from fragmentary survival. 
One must always ask of twelfth-century writs what interest men had 
in their preservation. As for the pipe rolls, the proportion of 
royal debts and, more specifically, judicial payments on them, 
remains o>bscure; I have merely collected here references to 
"warantia", "homagium" and similar terms. Hany are irrelevant to 
the present purpose. The common payments of royal moneys to 
individuals "pro escambio terre sue" or the like in the "Terris 
dads" sE~ction (e.g. Pipe Roll !t Henry n, lSI, 161) mostly 
reflect the king's acts as lord. Sometimes, though, the king is 
compensating a tenant whose land he has granted away to someone 
else, in a way no doubt common among private lords before royal 
enforcement of warranty becsme normal. The endowment of the Witham 
Charterhouse in 1182 (Pipe Roll 28 Henry n, 109; cf. ibid.,llS) 
is a clear example. 
3. Glanyill, iii. 3 (ed. Hall, 39). I am grateful in equal measure to 
Professor Donald Sutherland for directing my attention to the 
intricacies of Glanvill's text here and to Jeffrey Hackney and 
Paul Brand for laying bare the inadequacy of my first efforts to 
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understand them. 
4. Gl~il!, iii. 1 (ed. Hall, 37-8). In situation (1), the demandant 
should simply acquire a new writ and recommence proceedings 
against the genuine tenant. See also Bailey, eLJ ix. 83-4 for the 
lessee's aid-prayer. 
5. The discussion is Glanvill, iii. 6-8 (ed. Hall, 41-3). It can only 
be resolved in the shire or a royal court; Glanvill, xii. 8 (ed. 
Hall, 140). 
6. Glanvill, iii. 1-5 
7. See Glanvill, ed. Hall, lxvi-lxviii and 37 n. c. 
8. Glanvill, vi. 9 (ed. Hall, 63) gives a parallel writ in very' 
similar words for use in dower actions, to summon the heir of the 
deceased husband as warrantor. 
9. Glanvill, iii. 2 (ed. Hall, 39). Cf. H.D. Hazeltine, "Judicial 
Discretion in English Procedure of Henry the Second's Time", 
K~~tschrift ~ Gie~!~ (Weimar 1911), 1057-8, 1065. For the 
thirteenth century, cf. G.D.G. Hall in ~ Registers of ~, 
ed. Hall and E. De Haas (Selden Soc. 87, 1963), lxxxv, n.13. 
10. Glanvill, iii. 4 (ed. Hall, 39-40). ~ i. 3490 (1199) is a writ 
of attachment. Chattel warrantors in theft cases were not 
unnaturally Bubject to immediate attachment, Glanvill x. 16 (ed. 
Hall, 131). For the Cape ad valentiam, see Early Registers Qf 
Writs, J. 20-23, 27-29. Similar doubts on the constraint of a 
warrantor (this time the deceased's heir in the widow's action of 
dower) surface in Gl.anvill, vi. 9 (ed. Hall, 63-4). 
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11. Bailey, CLJ ix, 206 raises this unlikely possibility. Glanvill 
does not discuss all the procedures of his day. See my King. Lords 
and Peannts in Medieval England, 166 for another likely omission. 
12. Cf. ~an Caenegem, Royal ~, 239-48. 
13. Bailey, ~LJ ix (1945-7), 207-9, citing WUDECOT v. LANGFORD and 
HURTON v. FITZ(E~ERARD, which refers to the production of an 
original writ at a shire court in 1193. Cf. also Sutherland, 
Assize of Novel Disseisin, 219 and Hall, Early Registers of Writs, 
xxxviii, n. 1. 
14. A proof in the shire court at York "per breve de warantia carte" 
mentioned in EYC xi. 232 could conceivably take the story back to 
1182. 
15. Pipe Roll 31 Henry I, 20: father and son proffer 10 m. to have 
their holding from Wilton Abbey "aut escambium ad valens in 
comitatu"; ibid., 32: 20 m. "ut habeat escambium terre sue de E. 
ad valena",; ibid., 71: 20 m. "pro concessione escambii inter eum 
et R. de S. "; ibid., 74: 2 m. "pro placito nominis sui pro quodam 
escambio". Some at least of these proffers were surely made to 
secure royal assistance against a warranty voucher. Cf. also 
ibid., 145: two men made proffers of a mark of gold and 100 j-
respectively "ne escambium duraret quod fecit cum G.B~" 
16. The fact that ~an Caenegem, no.127 0156/7) was issued by Queen 
Eleanor need not distinguish it from ordinary royal writs. Dr. 
Brian Kemp informs me that it should read "monachis" (not 
"monachos" as transcribed by H.G. Richardson), the dative case 
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agreeing with the formulas of later writs. His inability to find a 
charter from the putative warrantor in the Reading cartularies 
suggests that none existed in the abbey's archives Bnd probably 
explains the absence of any charter reference in the writ. 
17. Registrum Antiguissimum, i. 189, p.118 (1156/66) refers to a 
charter. !Xf iii. 1458 (1164/75) refers to a charter in free alms; 
the royal confirmations EYC iii. 1428 (1121/7) and Monasticon 
Anglicanum vi, 93 (1154/8, 11155) may also be relevant. ~an 
Caenegem, no.128 (1170/83) refers to a charter and warns the 
vouchee not to harass his tenant. Pipe Roll 26 Henry 11, 121 
(1180), for which 40/- was due. concerned the dowry of the 
vouchor's mother. The absence of reference to a charter in Pipe 
Roll 11 Henry 11. 75 (1185). for which 5 m. was due, can be 
explained by the circumstances; see SOMERvILLE v LACY. Appendix 
II. Some of the many pipe roll payments "pro (or "de") escambio" 
may also be relevant. but many. such as those in the "Terris 
datis N sections. are not. 
18. Pipe £Qll 25 Henry 11. 78 records a proffer of 10 m •• which was 
paid off by 1182. Pipe Roll 28 Henry 11. 118. 
19. EYC v. 198 (1162/81). for which see GODRIC OF SKEEBY'S CASE 
(Appendix II). Stoke-by-C1are Cartulary. ii. ed. C. Harper-Bill 
and R. Mortimer (Sussex Charters v. Suffolk Rec. Soc. 1983). 319 
(1173/93) envisages ecclesiastical suits as well as Ncoram regeN. 
Even e!rlier is Chronicon Abbatie Rameseiensis. 273 (1134/60). 
20. The existe.ce of a temporarily separate action Quod Facist 
110 
Rati/nabile Escambium in the late 1190s might cast some slight 
doubt on the action',s autonomy. Cf. Bililey, CW ix, 205, n. 199, 
206, n. 108 and PKJ i. 3503 (1199) on which, however, see Hall, 
Early Registers of R!:ill, lxviii. 
21. Glanvil1 ix. 1 (ed. Hall, 103); cf. ibid. 2 (ed. Hall, 106) for 
the kind of technical hindrances to this speedy homage. The form 
changed little. Cf. PKJ i. 3528 (1199), a justiciar's writ 
relating to ~ ii. 11; PKJ i. 2427. 
22. As in the so-called '~uo Warranto" inquiries already considered. 
23. Glanvill ix. 4 (esp. ed. Hall, 108-9),5. 
24. The point of the lord's denial that he had previously refused the 
heir's homage, Glanvill, ix. 6 (ed. Hall, 109) was perhaps to 
escape amercement. 
25. A third-party claim naturally ruled out a swift decision "pendente 
lite". Cf. the 1206 case cited below n.31. 
26. Glanvill" ix. 6 drifts off to discuss other situations. One can 
imagine defences based on allegations that the deceased had 
forfeited his holding before his death or on a preferred claim 
from some third party allegedly with better right than the 
deceased" 
27. Ibid (ed. Hall, 110). 
28. Cf. Glanvill, ix. 9, 17 (ed. Hall, 82, 90). 
29. The first relevant pipe-roll entry seems to be Pipe Roll 25 Henry 
II, 49 (1178): 60 m., hawk and horse "ut electus L. accipiat 
homagium suum de tenemento patris sui". This concerned a 
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hereditary sergeanty, and thus differs from the situation covered 
by Glanvill, ix. 5. It never came to court; the debt continued to 
be enrolled as due until Pipe Roll 10 John, 79 (1210), perhaps 
because of the promisor's poverty; cf. Clay, Lines. Archit. ~ 
A!fh~~ol~ Soc. iii.2 (1945-7), 119-21. The only other examples 
noted before Glanvill are Pipe Roll 26 Henry il, 53 ( 60 m. "quia 
non cepit homagum J. de L."), 104 (10 m. "ut Comes Cestrie 
recipiat homagium suum et reddat ei terram S", paid 1183, 29 
Henry il, 36). Cf. also Pipe Roll 25 Henry il, 122 (1177): 10 m. 
"ut rex accipiat homagium suum", followed by 20 m. for seisin, 
presumably of the same holding. Entries relating to homages 
claimed of or due from royal tenants are not uncommon. It is hard 
to believe that Pipe Roll Society xiv. 135-6 (1195), concerning a 
single virgate, was worth an expensive writ. Yet the case went to 
a grand assize, as did a parallel action of right, ibid. 120, 
between the same parties concerning half a virgate in a different 
village. Of course, one expected to pay for a curia regis hearing; 
cf. ~!anvi!!, i. 2-3. PKl i. 2427, 3528; RCR ii. 11 (1199) 
unhelpfully records an extant justiciar's writ. 
30. The earliest payments that seem to relate to this writ are Pipe 
Roll 25 Henry il, 49 (1179), 60 m. from the son of a sergeanty 
tenant of the bishop-elect of Lincoln, and Pipe Roll 26 Henry il, 
104 (1180), 10 m. that the earl of Chester receive homage for 
Serlo the huntsman',s land. The 60 m. fine "quia non cepit 
homagium", Ibid., 53 (180), might come from another case. 
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31. It is certainly not beyond a lawyer's wit to think up other 
situations in which the writ of Glanvill. ix. 5 would be 
appropriate. See ibid. 1-2 for situations where a tenant was 
alleged in his lord's court to incur forfeiture for committing an 
atrox injuria sgainst his lord or otherwise acting to his 
disherison. Use in such situations would offer another example of 
a "Precipe" writ serving to bring into the royal courts domestic 
disputes from within a lordship. However. no such cases are known 
to me. One cannot often deduce the situation behind cases on the 
early plea rolls. CRR i. 139 (1200) is. however. one case thst 
clearly does fit the Glanvill pattern; the plaintiff had recently 
recovered by mort dances tor. Another is ICKWORTH v. COLCHESTER 
ABBEY (Appendix II). 
32. As Hilsom. LF. 129-30. The plaintiff in ICKWORTH v. COLCHESTER 
ABBEY did possess a charter. while some "Precipe" warranty 
plaintiffs (for whom see below) did not. 
33. Cf. the Prohibition to Court Christian. 
34. Glanvill. iii. 3; vi. 9 (ed. Hall. 39. 63). 
35. See above n.16 for van Caenegem. no. 127 (1156/7) and below 
Appendix II for SOMERvILLE v. LACY (1185). The writ of summons 
needed less justifying; but cf. Pipe E2ll 11 Henry 11. 75 (1185). 
reciting a previous warranty or acquittal in Tickhill honorial 
court. 
36. Not till 1169 does a pipe roll contain more than the odd reference 
to warranty or warrants. Cf, Pipe Roll 15 Henry 11. 17. 23. 26 
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(bis), 89, 110, which illustrate a range of possible meanings. 
37. Milsom, Novae Narrationes (Selden Soc. 80, 1963), clviii-clxiii 
should be read along with Hall, Early Registers of RI!!!, xxviii, 
lxxvi, n.13, Hib. 54, CC. 133, J. 35-40 and R. 457. 
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Append ix II; Select Cases 
GODRIC OF SKEEBY'S CASE. ]If v. 196-8 (after 1155). 
Richard II de Rolios (honorial baron of Richmond) granted 46 
acres in Brompton to Godric of Skeeby (the next Swaledale village) 
for a nominal rent (no. 196 of 1155/65). Later (1), 1162/5, Richard 
gave to his nPopos Harold f. Aldred of Richmond 1 carucate in Skeeby, 
which Godric had previously held of a mesne lord, from whose son 
Harold was n0101 to hold (264). Pace the editor (p.158), Godric seems 
to have been alive at the time. When Harold gave Easby Abbey 32 
acres of Brompton moor (? part of Godric' s grant in (10. 196), at 
around this time, Richard's confirmation (no. 198, as lord as well 
as benefactor) was expressed as "ita quod warantizabo pro posse meo 
contra omnes et nominatim contra Godricum. Et 5i vis regia vel 
justiciarius capitalis compulerit me ••• ", he would stand with the 
abbey as best he could. 
HURTON (rectius UPTON) v FITZ, EvERARD. PRS xiv. 124 (Bedford eyre 1194). 
Comment Bailey, CLl ix, 195; Milsom, LF, 132, n.l. 
Plaintiff's lord was probably also his (?elder) brother, 
William, who held a fractional fee (a half or one twentieth) of the 
honor of Wallingford. [lowe the identification of "Hurton" with 
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Upton, Beds. to Dr. Paul Brand. See VCH Bucks. ii. 226-7, Book of 
~, 461, 463, 466 and cf. ibid., 555, 875.1 This may be identical 
with the 6 virgates that owed castle-guard at Wallingford in 1197, 
Hunter, Fines i, 160-1. The disputants both belonged to the group of 
prominent freeholders who served the shire as recognitors etc. Cf. 
PRS xiv. 142, 143; RCR i. 384, 432; 2 ibid. 87, 160 etc. 
A possible reading of the successive proceedings dating back to 
1192-3 (and patently impossible to reconstruct with confidence from 
our single plea-roll entry) might run as follows. Geoffrey of Upton 
sued Robert f. Everard in his brother's court for 3 virgates by writ 
of right patent. Robert, though the sitting tenant, was unable to 
persuade William de Upton to warrant him. After William's court had 
found for Geoffrey, Robert had the dispute removed to the shire 
court on the ground of false judgement. The shire apparently accepted 
the allegation of falsity, but Robert prevented it from proceeding to 
a final judgement until he could bring before the shire a writ De 
Warantia Carte (breve justice) addressed to William de Upton. On that 
day, when all three parties were present together, William's charter 
to Robert was read out in court. William acknowledged it as his, but 
pleaded that it did not bind him to warrant, "cum in carta nulla fiat 
mencio de dono suo nee de warentia". The shire's failure to reach a 
decision suggests that courts were already implying warranty in the 
absence of an express commitment. After successive adjournments and a 
civil war, Geoffrey had the whole case transferred before royal 
justices by a Recordari Facias, presumably in order to obtain royal 
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help to oust Robert finally from the disputed land. 
It is hsrd not to believe that the two brothers were not 
acting in collusion, which may explain why Robert impugned the 
whole record upon which this reconstruction is basedl [~roll ~ 
Richard I, 208 probably refers to PRS xiv. 137 and is thus not 
germane to thiB case.] 
ICKWORTH v COLCHESTER ABBEY. CRR iv. 61, 141, 144, 281 (Suffolk 1206). 
The parti.es to this De Homagio Capiendo had agreed to concord, 
when the abbot changed his mind; noting that the plaintiff was 
himself being sued for the land in question (one carucate), he was 
unwilling "to take homage therein before he knows which of the two 
ought to remain". He had become aware of a pending action of right 
(MANNESTON v ][CKWORTH CRR iv. 96, 104, 177) against Richard and his 
wife Sybil, brought by one Richard f. John de Manneston', who had 
paid 2 m. to bring ~ ~~ a mise that Richard and Sybil had put 
themselves into land of which his father, John de Manneston', had 
been seised at his death, Rot. ~ ~ g!~, 343-4; Pipe Roll ~ 
John, 237. NOI: until the issues in the second case were clarified 
did the abbot take Richard of Ickworth's homage. 
A family tree is useful. 
Margaret 
de Ely 
Richard 
John de 
Msnston 
Sybil 
Philip 
Thomas 
Richard de 
Ickworth 
Thomas 
117 
Richard de Manneston was perhaps only recently of age. His mother had. 
he pleaded. held the disputed land as his guardian for 10 years after 
his father's death. until Richard. his sister's husband. had intruded 
("miserunt se iniuste"). The tenants responded that they held by 
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John's grant in frankmarriage, made during his lifetime so that 
neither he nor his widow Margaret was seised thereafter, except under 
a lease-back for 20/- p.a. rent payable by John's brother Thomas from 
the other family property at Stradbrook, 20 odd miles away on the 
Norfolk border. Although this plea can be fully confirmed by the text 
of the grant as recorded -- significantly -- in the Colchester 
cartulary (Cart. Monast. S.J. Bapt. Colecestria ii, ed. S.A.Moore, 
Roxburghe Club 124, 1897, 523-4), the parties proffered 1 m. each for 
a jury. The verdict, though unrecorded on extant rolls, must have gone 
to Richard of Ickworth, whose homage was received by the abbot of 
Colchester on the Morrow of St. Martins. No wonder the abbot would not 
act sooner I 
[Richard of Ickworth also held 2 fees of Bury, whose acts he witnessed 
at around the time of the case; cf. Cal. I.P.M. i. 848, R.H.C.Davis 
(ed.), !alen4~ Ql Abbot Sa~Qn (Camden soc. 3rd series, lxxxiv, 1954), 
pp. 24 sq. and nos. 1, 26, 48, 60 and W.A.Copinger, Manors of Suffol! 
vii. 69, 102-1. 
LANvALAY v. BEAUCHAMP (re EATON SOCON AND SANDY) 1198-1203. 
RCR ii. 279; CRR i. 68, 70, 106, 108-9, 227, 340, 401; ii. 4-5, 
187; iii. 14. 
In this action of right, demandant correctly based his claim 
on seisin (by his maternal grandfather, Hamo de St. Clair) in Henry 
I's reign, "die et anno quo obiit". Behind Hamo's seisin, by royal 
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grant of c. 1120, lurks the fall of the Mandevills after the 1101 
revolt. Many of their lands then passed "temporarily" to Eudo Dapifer 
until a debt of more than two thousand pounds was paid. Hamo, a vassal 
of Eudo's, seems to have acquired the disputed honor after Eudo's 
death. 
The Beauchamp claim through the dispossessed Mandevills was 
temporarily successful at a time when Stephen aided the Mandevills to 
recover lost lands. Under Henry II, Hamo's son Hubert, Hugh I de 
Beauchamp, then Hubert's daughter and her husband (our demandant's 
father, William I de Lanvalay) were successively in seisin. Politics 
and the control of the relevant heiress seem to have been decisive', 
Our demandant was left a minor at his father's death in 1180/2, which 
probably let in Hugh de Beauchamp again (ob. 1187), his son Oliver 
(ob. c. 1190) and finally his grandson, the tenant in our case. His 
minority over, our demandant made a substantial proffer in 1194 for 
the king's goodwill and his property. Neither the money nor the 
property appear to have changed hands. Certainly, John at his 
accession showed no initial favour to William de Lanvalay. Hugh de 
Beauchamp's hopes of securing royal support for his tenure however 
apparently came to nothing. On the other hand, no verdict has been 
found; the action no doubt foundered at the demandant's death in 1204. 
Sources for the claims cited in LJ. Sanders, English Baronies (Oxford 
1960), 40, 92; S. Painter, The Reign of King John (Baltimore 1949), 
59, 332; G.H. Fowler, ~~RS ii (1914), 64-5; C. W. Hollister, History 
Iviii (1973), 19-21, 25; Farrer, ~~ and !nights Fees iii. 249-50. 
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Bbth claims in this case genuinely go back behind 1153, and 
indeed 1135. 
REX v. MALKAEL fj.~ Rolls 26 Henry 11. 74; 27 Henry 11, 43. 
In 1178-9 Unfrid Malkael owed the exchequer 15 m. "quia 
advocavit tenere terram de (Crosby Ravensworth, Westmoreland) de alio 
quam de rege". The lord of whom he claimed to hold is later revealed 
to have been one Robert f. Peter. A possible meaning of this emerges 
from a later lawsuit, known only from the enrollment of its outcome on 
the pipe roll of 1194-5. In this a royal justice Henry of Whiston 
successfully extracted from Unfrid's heir. Geoffrey Malkael. a 
quitclaim of both Crosby and the nearby manor of Lowther. [Pipe Roll I 
!li£.h!I.l!!. 148. Henry',s efforts to establish his rights over the two 
vilIs are also illustrated by the fine. Pipe Roll Soc. xx. 128 
(1197).] Geoffrey's claims were recognised by a grant back in fee of 3 
bovstes in Crosby. For this. he had to hand over s charter of Hugh de 
Morevill to Unfrid. I guess that in 1178 Unfrid was being punished 
for failing to attorn his service to the king, after his grantor Hugh 
had suffered forfeiture for his complicity in the 1173 revolt, 
Sanders, English Baronies. 59 and n. 6. snd that Henry of Whiston's 
aunt. by whose right he sued later. was in some way involved. In 
effect Unfrid had been looking to the wrong lord for his warranty. 
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SOMERvILLE v LACY. Pipe Roll 11 ~ 11, 75 (1185). 
Plaintiff was head of a family substantial enough to hold fees 
of several other lordships apart from Lacy. His cousin, from a cadet 
branch which had retained Yorkshire interests despite moving to 
Scotland in Henry I',s reign, seems to have solicited from Robert (1) 
de Lacy the grant of part of the family lands. See W.E. Wightman, The 
Lacy Family in England and Normandy. 1066-1194 (Oxford 1966), 39, 93 
n.4, 100 and G.W.S. Barrow, The Anglo-Norman Era in Scottish History 
(Oxford 1980), 107-9, 193-5 on EYC iii. 1650-3. The present writ was 
thus intended to compel the lord to stick to his existing warranty of 
the sitting tenant rather than to be swayed by the moral claim of 'the 
other branch of the family; any allocation should no doubt come out of 
the lord's demesne. 
SPALDING ABBEY v. BICKER. PKJ iv. 4477; CRR vi. 283, 342, 351-2; 
Pipe Roll 14 John, 110, III (Lines. 1212). 
Cited Milsom LF, 47, n.l. 
This ''Quo Waranto" summons (5 m. for the writ) alleged 
intrusion after a tenant~,s death into land that should have escheated 
"pro defectu heredum". The defendant claimed that the deceased, while 
still in full possession of his faculties had made him a legitimate 
grant with livery of seisin. Both sides proffered for a jury, whose 
verdict appears lost. 
If the deceased was the Robert clerk of Bicker, who appears a 
few years earlier (Lincoln Rec. Soc. xxii, nos. 921, 945, 1065), the 
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basis for the dispute becomes clear. Spalding had been acting through 
the courts to enforce services against its tenants here in Moulton and 
in nearby Pinchbeck, and William f. Rannu1ph, who put in his claim to 
this holding, was one of those sued (Rot. de Ob. et ~, 512, 525-6). 
The present case was no doubt part of this drive to enforce rights of 
lordship. 
SUDBURY v CLARE ("COUNTESS AMICIA'S CASE"). PKJ, i. 3199 RCR, 
ii. 180; CRR, i. 186, 225, 249 (Suffolk 1200). 
Legal comment Milsom, LF, 45-6, 56, 92-3 etc.; Palmer Michigan 
~ ~ lxxix (1981), 1137-8; and Palmer, Law and History Review iii 
(1985), 22-3. 
The assize was heard at Westminster because of a 2 m. proffer 
by the plaintiff, Pipe roll 1 John, 148 (paid by 1204, Pipe roll ~ 
John, 237); no counter-proffer is known. Countess Amicia was one of 
three daughters of Earl William of Gloucester and was married to 
Richard de Clare at around the time when Richard's fence-sitting 
posture in the 1173-4 revolt made him suspect to Henry II, S.Painter, 
Feudalism ~nd Liberty (Baltimore, Md. 1961), 222-3. In 1176, the king 
promised Amicis and the third sister UlOO worth of land each as part of 
a deal by which he acquired for his youngest son, John, the oldest 
sister, Isabella, and the expectation of the earldom of Gloucester 
(R.B; Patterson, Earldom of Gloucester Charters,S); she may not have 
received her full share, though she did hold 15 fees about the time of 
the case (PipE! roll i John, 283). The political circumstances of this 
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marriage, and thus the subsequent divorce, remain obscure. 
As to the diyortium, we have only Amice's statement that it 
was by papal grant "per lineam consanguinitatis", possibly on the 
ground that both spouses were descended from Henry 1. Esrl Richard ',s 
life grant of a 110 annuity to a lady who may have been his mistress, 
though perhaps from this time, [Cf. CRR viii. 62 = BNB' 52 (1219). 
Painter's supposition adopted by M. Altschul, ~ Baronial Family in 
Medieval England: the Clares 1217-1314 (Baltimore 1965), 30 receives 
some slight support from the fact that Earl Gilbert personally 
defended the 1219 suit; cf. CRR viii. 62, 267, 287, 370.] is less 
likely to be relevant than the fact that the two families had been 
enemies in Stephen's reign or the marriage's failure to produce the 
expected material rewards. 
The disputed land, to be distinguished from the other Sudbury 
long in Clare hands [W.A.Copinger, The Manor! of Suffolk: ~ Hundreds 
of Babergh and Blackbourn (1905), 231-2; Red Book of the Exchequer, i, 
ed. H.Hall (896), 37, 406-7], as Prof. R.B~ Patterson very kindly 
pointed out to me, belonged to Amicia. It had been, so she asserts 
elsewhere, part of her dowry (her father, earl William, had dealt as 
lord with the church there in 1176; cf. CRR iv. 139-40. ), Stoke-by-
Clare Cartulary, i, ed. C. Harper-Bill and R. Mortimer ( = Suffolk 
Charters iv, 1982), nos. 60, 63. 
A few legal comments may be added. Amicia's inability to 
dissuade the court from permitting Richard to wage his law on the 
issue of his free submission to her court judgement was pivotal. The 
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non-appearance of the plaintiff and his oath-helpers on Amicia '.s 
Sudbury charters (where some of her co-disseisors do appear) marks him 
off as an outsider and points to the value to him of securing wager of 
law. Had he not done so, or had the case gone to assize in the normal 
way, the issues would not only have been hidden from us but might well 
have been decided differently. There is no hint, for example, that 
Richard posselssed a charter of Earl Richard to establish Amicia's 
consent to the grant or any obligation to warrant. One must also 
wonder why she did not go on to bring a writ of right after losing the' 
assize. 
These facts added to the recent change of regime encourage one to 
seek a political explanation, stemming from the relations between the new 
king and Earl Richard de Clare. The years 1199-1200 seem almost the only 
time in the reign before the Magna Carta revolt itself, when the earl was 
of political consequence. He was disgruntled because he had received only a 
tiny share of the Gloucester honor (through Amice, the third sister) while 
John had managed to take the lion's share. Thus, on Richard I's death, the 
new king's advisers listed him among those magnates whose uncertain 
loyalties claimed special attention. They extracted fealty from Richard and 
others at Nor~hampton in 1199 in return for a promise that the new king 
would render to each his i~~, that is, favour his property claims. Earl 
Richard had more reason than most to feel sensitive. In the first months of 
the new reign, John was planning to exchange the Gloucester earldom for the 
county of Evreux, as part of his planned marriage alliance with Phillip of 
France. At the same time, he was seeking to dissolve the marriage to 
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Isabella by whose right he held Gloucester. [5. Painter, The Reign of King 
John (Baltimore 1949), 13, 21; Altschul, 24-6; G.E.C., Complete ~rage, v. 
502; vi. 692-3. Cf. Howden, Chronicon, iv. 88 for the 1199 oath.] 
Amice must have known that the odds were against her once the 
case came before a royal court. Direct royal intervention may not even 
have been necessary, once the plaintiff ',s proffer brought the case to 
Westminster. Amice~.s failure to sttempt recovery by an action of right 
suggests that she understood what she was up against. At least three 
details of the record accord particularly well with the idea that this 
was a "political" decision. The first two are: (1.) the plaintiff's 
proffer and (2.) the relative inactivity of the Countess, without 
counter-proffer or later writ of right. The third is the unususl 
decision (cf. Milsom, LF, 45-6) to let the plaintiff wage his law that he 
had not been summoned, let alone willingly pleaded in Amice's court. A 
precedent that permitted royal justices to over-rule seignorial court 
decisions in assizes of novel disseisin had in any event rather obvious 
attractions for John. Amice's case has indeed a quite particular interest 
for our understanding of the workings of royal control of justice at the 
time. 
UPTON v FITZ, EvERARD. See HURTON v FITZ, EvERARD above. 
WUDECOT v LANGFORD. PRS xiv. 14; RCR i. 126 (1193-5) 
Cited Bailey, CLl ix, 202, n. 79, 206, n. 108, 208, n. 118. 
Robert of Woodcote, a substantial landholder [R.W. Eyton, 
Antiquities of Shropshire, vii (1858) 335; ix (1859), 11 sq., 17.] 
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seems to have been successfully sued in novel disseisin at the 
Shropshire eyre of 11191 by one Robert de Huntele or Huntiland. Both of 
them may have sought to hold of Eva de Langford, an heiress in her own 
right. Some years later, seven of the recognitors could not remember 
whom she had warranted. 
Robert of Woodcote sought his exchange from Eva, apparently by 
Warantia Carte, at the Shropshire eyre of 1193. Eva, no doubt advised 
by her new second husband Walter of Wheatfield, brother to a royal 
justice, had the case put to a jury, for which she paid a mark. [Pipe 
Roll 1 ~i£hard 1, 112; cf. R~ ~ 1 Richard 1, 152, 254.1 The case 
was adjourned to Westminster, where Walter, on his wife's behalf 
"petit breve per quod implacitatur". If this means that he sought a 
sight of the original writ, it suggests that Warantia Carte was not 
yet a routine action. In the absence of a verdict, Eyton conjectured 
that Woodcote won his case, Eyton, viii (1859), 101-8 etc. Certainly, 
the Woodcotes were holding of Eva by 1208, CRR v. 270, 281. 
By 1199 fresh proceedings were under way at Westminster, a 
Recordari Facias obtained to question the original assize decision. 
have so far been unable to disentangle the subsequent course of this 
third case and its connection with the earlier dispute. The main 
references noted, and used above, are as follows;- William Salt 
Society iii. 501 (Stafford eyre); RCR ii. 239; CRR i. 197, 238, 461; 
PK.1 i. 197, 513 0199-1201) 
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Appendix III: The Treaty of Westminster 1153 and Legal Change 
Milsom phrased his original insight very briefly, almost as an 
aside. He had noticed parallel to the peace treaty of 1153 "a general 
provision that those disinherited during the anarchy should be 
restored to the rights they had under Henry I". This he proposed, on 
the ~asis of action of right counts citing seisin from Henry I'.s reign 
on the early plea rolls, as the origin of "the writ of right as a 
regular action".l 
Robert Palmer transformed this modest suggestion into a model of 
the process by which a rule might have been generated to cover di~putes 
in the exceptional situation after the ending of the civil war. He 
argued by analogy that once the Treaty of Westminster had restored 
peace at the highest political level, there was a need for a rule to 
govern land disputes stemming from the events of the Anarchy. Then he 
surveyed some of the central legal developments of the reign to show 
how well these fitted the hypothesis. 
Palmer described his "rule" as follows. "An accepted tenant 
currently possessed of lands would remain tenant for life. At his 
death, however, his heir would be denied in favor of an outside 
claimant, whose ancestor had been tenant in fee in 1135 such that, in 
the normal course of things,2 he would have been regarded as heir." 
Lords were not supposed to discipline tenants "for matters relating to 
Stephen's reign". In practice, of course, everyone concerned had an 
interest in compromise. This interest was not absolute; thus tension 
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over its consequences favoured royal intervention and explains the 
standardization of the Breve de Recto. 3 
The dearth of direct evidence for the second settlement of 1153 
and the tenurial rule it produced is not in itself too serious for 
Palmer',s hypothesis. True, the scattered records of litigation from the 
next decade or so do nothing to document it. Indeed, we possess more 
examples of compromise exceptions than of the rule itself. 4 But this 
silence is quite explicable. It is always hard to illustrate current 
law from actual cases in this period, but disputes ending in compromise 
might be expected to be more carefully recorded than those decided by a 
regular rule. 
In any event, the hypothesis' real strength is its substantial 
congruity with detailed aspects of the legal reforms. Judgements on its 
validity must concentrate on this aspect of the case, and also consider 
what appears to be an important premise behind, the notion that the 
Anarchy had created a situation demanding a new custom, one which 
established rules could not handle. "Warfare had occasioned many 
disinheritances", Palmer pointed out, "either by conquest and regrant 
or by disciplinary action."S Perhaps men felt that only innovation 
could find a way out. 
* * * 
Medieval litigants had notoriously long memories for the rights 
they clsimed ss their own. Actions of right on the early plea rolls 
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from around 1200 are frequently founded on seisin more than half a 
century old. It is therefore striking to find that a fair number of 
their parties plead seisin from Henry 1'6 reign, none from Stephen's. 
This looks very much like a policy decision of Henry II, enforced by 
his courts. As late as 1169-70, one litigant was punished for 
attempting to plead "de factis tempore werre", while in 1175-6 another 
paid 20 m. "pro recognitione de feodo ••• a tempore regis Stephani", 
apparently an exceptional privilege. 6 Apparently, this rule became 
permanent. 
Another rule, setting Henry I's death as the last moment of 
official peace was equally long-lasting. By it, claims to have 
possessed right at or before Henry's accession had to rest on seisin 
from 1135 or earlier. 7 This could have originated as a minimum 
requirement, coexisting with the protection of sitting tenants who had 
acquired seisin during Stephen's reign, i.e. since 1135. 8 There is, 
however, no obvious reason to attribute this pleading limitation to a 
second settlement in 1153. It could quite as easily have resulted from 
decisions made during the months after the Treaty of Westminster or 
after the start of Henry II's reign proper. That the plea rolls say 
nothing of an 1153 origin means nothing; it could have been forgotten 
in the intervening generation. But more nearly contemporary evidence is 
no more forthcoming. Royal and ducal acta from the months before 
S tephen',s death do not suggest that the peace had established any new 
policy on the establishment of right. 9 No reference to the peace has 
yet emerged from any of Henry II's early writs. Before 1170, indeed, 
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the writs do not even mention the existence of sitting tenants. 10 The 
new rule could. therefore be unconnected. with legislative concessions to 
sitting tenants who had entered their holdings during Stephen's reign. 
It might simply have emerged over time. 
Anothe,r innovation early on in the new reign confirms that 
Henry and his advisers were certainly not afraid to fine-tune the 
pleading rules. This was a statutum enacting that, to succeed in land 
claims, Englishmen must plead seisin posterior to 1135. Apparently the 
English are to be the exceptions to the general prohibition against 
pleading seisin from Stephen's reign and the otherwise general right to 
plead seisin from Henry I'a reign. They alone had to plead on facts 
from the reign of the despised Stephen I Curiously, an early writ of 
Stephen's cOnlltituted a precedent. This rule, which can be glimpsed in 
effect during the years up to about 1170, seems unconnected. with 1153 
and more probably resulted from over-exuberant attempts by optimistic 
descendants of English landholders to put in their claims at the start 
of Henry II',s reign. ll It certainly helps to confirm the early 
establishment of Henry 1',s death as a legal landmark, but does little 
to assist in pinning down the precise date at which this happened. 
The more one looks at the indirect evidence for the second 
settlement, the more unsettling the scarcity of direct evidence 
becomes. Pat4mtly, there was more to the peace settlement than appears 
in the Westminster charter; the question is how much more, beyond a 
bare order that disseisin and plunder should cease. What was to be done 
to remedy exil3ting inequities? Even the most directly helpful chronicle 
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passages fall far short of compelling one to believe in the generation 
of any novel rule. Robert de Torigni's point may be that intruders 
(invasores) in a period of undoubted werra had never acquired lasting, 
legitimate seisin. In similar vein the Gesta Stephani recorded a 
consensus that "the disinherited be recalled to their own, and 
(property?) rights and laws commanded to all according to pristine 
custom". This appears to go beyond Robert, to hold that disseisins 
during the Anarchy were subject to the good old custom, meaning 
presumably the rules administered under Henry I. Neither author 
emphasized the day of Henry I's death, or expressly mentioned 
legislative innovation of any kind, nor did they feel any apparent need 
to advocate compromise. They may be doing little more than restating 
the need for a return to law along the old lines, where only peaceful 
seisin counted. 12 Both talk in terms of immediate action, which is 
also the general impression given by the Treaty of Westminster and 
other sources. An arrangement that might take many years to come to 
fruition would leave problems in the interim with worse difficulties to 
follow. How. twenty odd years after the peace, was one going to 
determine whether a claimant really was entitled as one of the 
disinherited? In the circumstances, what was wanted was surely 
immmediate settlements even at a cost. 
When all is said and done, the Treaty of Westminster was a 
precarious compromise made against the wishes of both principals. 13 
Subsequent events might easily have nullified its effect. The king's 
son, William, never made any express renunciation of his claims. 
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Stephen himself was no "lame duck" in early 1154; some observers 
thought he was actually coming into his own. Nobody expected him to die 
so soon. This was a stroke of luck for Henry, who had scarcely been in 
a position to create controversial new rules while Stephen lived, nor 
indeed for some time after his own accession. Study of the political 
narrative of Stephen',s last year as it unfolded week by week gives good 
reason not to place undue weight on the paper terms of a peace 
settlement, documented or not. Like men at the time, we should expect 
the lasting shape of future custom to emerge slowly and painfully out 
of the political turmoil. 
There must, therefore, be some doubt how far contemporaries 
really felt the need for a new rule to implement the treaty settlement 
among their followers. In the first place, conscious law reform was 
still exceptional. 14 In the second, the talk in 1153 was dominated by 
hopes for a return to the better practices of the past after recent 
horrors. Men are likely to have submitted their disputes either to 
established custom (ie on the basis of proving better right by 
legitimate seisin in time of peace) or (political) negotiation, as in 
most of the documented cases. 
The particular hypothesis under consideration seems for these 
reasons best regarded as unproven for the present. Yet the notion of 
focussing the spotlight of research on the end of the Anarchy and the 
Angevin take-over is surely correct. Much of what remains to be done is 
germane to the present study. One example is the problem of the sitting 
tenant in the years before 1153. Some of the twelfth-century occasions 
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when lords' feelings towards their vassals shifted to the point of 
ousting one family in favour of another were demonstrably for normal 
political reasons quite unconnected with the Civil War. Study of the 
tenurial shifts within the major lay baronies of the mid-twelfth 
century is an urgent, if challenging, need. A good deal hangs on shifts 
in magnate allegiances and their consequences to lesser men in the 
period between, say, 1140 and 1176. Much the same is true of changes in 
the landlord families themselves. The dynastic changes of 1135 and 
1153-4 could well be studied in this light. Their effect on noble land-
holding needs scrutiny along the same kind of lines as major 
transitions in other periods, such as the Dissolution of the 
Monasteries or the English Civil War. This could become a standard 
assignment in studies of twelfth-century honors. 1S We need first to 
identify the tenurial discontinuities, before we can know how 
profoundly they were affected by the events of 1153-4. 
Another line of attack is to compare the hypothesis with known 
legislation of the day. One early example known entirely from royal 
acta, the statutum on English land claims, was discussed above. 
Another, rather differently evidenced, concerned disputes over the 
possession of churches, a form of real property still valuable albeit 
increasingly controversial in the lay world of Angevin England. The 
rules governing church possession appear to have changed at least once 
in the course of Henry II's reign. ~ery soon after Henry's accession, 
he apparently issued an edictum or constitutio against unjust 
occupations. As allegedly enforced in a royal writ of reseisin no 
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longer extant, this simply declared unjust seisin null and put the 
ousted claimant back in. The case which brings it to our attention 
involves a large-scale disseisin from Stephen's reign of the kind that 
might well have come under an 1153 settlement. 16 Glanvill offers a 
different rule, which has been connected with a papal decretal of 
1173/6. It has been decided ("statutum est ••• in regno domini Regis"), 
he says, that clerks who entered churches by violence but "tempore 
werre" are to keep them during their lifetime.!7 The late date 
suggests that the ~ in question was the rebellion of 1173-4. 
Otherwise it would be tempting to associate the rule with the 
circumstances of 1153. Ironically, this comes as close as anything to 
direct evidence for the hypothesis. 
The measures chosen to implement the peace settlement could 
easily have been much less exceptional than the settlement itself. The 
evidence for an undocumented agreement between Stephen and Henry of 
Anjou late in 1153 to submit their followers' disputes to a novel 
compromise rule remains too fragmentary to compel acceptance. The 
supposed rule, fails most of the possible tests. Yet the treaty 
undeniably did trigger a process of tenurial sorting, by claim, 
counterclaim, compromise and confirmation, that continued into the new 
Angevin regime. The rule, that seisin, to be valid, had to pre-date 
Henry 1'.,s dea.th in 1135, may not result from any forma.l enactment. The 
known litigation could have generated such a customary practice without 
any formal decision. Perhaps royal justices and advisers simply began 
to implement a known custom that valid seisin had to begin in time of 
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peace. To have made this a question of fact in each case was 
impractical, beyond contemporary judicial machinery. The death of Henry 
I was the natural, almost the inevitable choice for a rule-of-thumb 
date. After the civil war of John',s reign, the courts similarly ignored 
seisins acquired in time of war. 18 Nevertheless, the decision, 
however reached, was a portentous and exemplary one; right from the 
start of the reign, the king's men were interpreting custom and 
declaring how it ought to work. 
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Footnotes to Appendix 111 
1. Hilsom, LF, 178-9 and see below. 
2. ie without the need for warranty. 
3. Palmer, "Origin of Property", 9-12. The writ of right's 
"operational peculiarity" to which he refers is due to its date; 
the form of writ close (with its character of a one-off 
purchase, in contrast to the w·rit patent',s form as a lasting 
privilege) was not yet in the 1150s standard for litigation 
writs. 
4. One settlement, the Berkeley double marriage pact was made in 
Duke Henry's presence and almost certainly according to his 
wishes at very much the same time as the pOlitical settlement. 
See for its terms, decidedly asymmetrical and hard to square 
with the alleged rule, I.H. Jeayes, Descriptiye Catalogue of the 
~nA!!~I! ~~~ ~ Ber!~!~y Castle (Bristol 1892), no. 4 and cf. 
Barkly, Trans. Bristol and Gloucs. Arch. Soc •. viii (1883-4), 
205-6, Regesta iii. 272, 309-11. 
5. "Origin of Property", 9. 
6. Pipe Rolls 16 Henry II, 51; 22 Henry 11, 184. References to 
~ from later in the reign probably refer to 1173-4, as Pipe 
Roll 25 ~ 11, 119. The inference that Henry considered 
Stephen a usurper is not required; in Normandy, he tended to 
ignore his own father's acts as if Geoffrey'.s time as duke were 
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equally a mere interregnum, Haskins, Norman Institutions, 135. 
7. Milsom, LF, 178-9. inferred that this formula, making 1135 "the 
last moment of peace and legitimate title ••• set hard under 
Henry II". during those early years when the writ of right',s 
"regular machinery" was born, "to implement the single decision 
that those put out during the anarchy should be put back 
again". LAN>/ALAY v. BEAUCHAMP (App. II) is one relevant case. 
8. It is not clear that anyone had the automatic right to plead 
such long seisin. Even in John's reign. litigants can be found 
making substantial proffers to make tenure before 1135 of the 
issue. (I have only surveyed the 21 cases from the overlap 
between Richard I and John in CRR i and vii.) The demandant in 
CRR i. 38. 61 (1198) paid 15 m. for his writ. ~ Roll ~ 
Richard 1. 40. Cf. Rot. ~ ~ ~~. 13. 414-5 for clearer 
cases; in the first 10 m. made the issue seisin in Henry I',s 
time; in the second a tenant paid 40 ozs. of gold for the king 
to stay a writ of right concerning land which his ancestors had 
held in peace since Henry l's reign. For Englishmen, see further 
below. 
9. See Regesta iii, xliii-xliv, xlvii-xlviii for list of acta. The 
formulstion of grants and confirmations by either king or duke, 
separately or in each other's company, is outright and 
unconditional. Stephen twice in 1154 made general confirmations 
to religious of their property as held at or shortly after the 
Treaty of Westminster, nos. 696, 866. But Henry confirmed 
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Savigny's property as at the date when he had crossed to 
England, L. Delisle and E. Berger, Receuil des ~ ~ Henri 11 
i (Paris 1916), no. 82 (1154), and his confirmation of the 
chamberlain's office (Regesta iii. 582), made before the peace 
treaty, conveys it as the grantee held it "in anno et die quo 
Rex Henricus fuit vivus et mortuus". I cannot see that these 
confirmations differ much from earlier royal ones, other than in 
their number. 
10. See, for example, ~an Caenegem, ~ Writs, n08. 18-22, 86-94. 
Ibid., no. 87 = Regesta iii. 286 (1136/41, 11138) is irrelevant 
here because of its corrected early date. ~an Caenegem, 277-8 
attributes to the flood of confirmations during the 
reconstruction period the "legal presumption" that seisin under 
Henry I put a claimant in the right. Royal writs do sometimes 
mention the legislation or occasion that gave them birth; see 
below. 
11. As I suggested in King, Lords and Peasants in Medieval England, 
252; cf. ~an Caenegem, no. 169. ~an Caenegem, no. 165 = Regesta 
iii. 134 (1135/9) is the possible precedent. 
12. Cf. Milsom. LF, 178-9, and especially his remarks about seisin 
in time of peace and "tempore guerre". As he notes, counts in 
the action of right expressly contended that the seisin pleaded 
had been pacific. Though this feature might have become standard 
in the 1150s, it would certainly not have been out of place in 
the (admittedly different) land suits earlier in the century. 
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Further research is needed. The dictum of Glanvill, xiii. 11 
(ed. Hall, 155) that assizes of mort dancestor were unavailable 
to anyone who had ever been "in guerra" against the king may be 
making a similar point. Alternatively, it might be read as 
commentary on the 1173-4 revolt. 
13. This paragraph essentially follows White, "The Restoration of 
Order in England, 1153-1165", 32-57. 
14. Cf. my "Henry II and Ganelon". Bilt there was legislation st 
least for problem cases, especially early in the reign; see 
Cheney, "The Litigation Between John Marshall and Archbishop 
Thomas Becket", 23-4 and below. 
15. Enlightment in this as in other areas can be expected from David 
Crouch's project on "The Social Structure of the Medieval 
English Aristocracy, 1066-1272". Meanwhile, J. Le Patourel, "The 
Norman Conquest, 1066, 1106, 1154", Procs. Battle Conference Q!! 
Anglo-Norman Studies, i, ed. R. Allen Brown (Ipswich 1979), 114 
sq. offers some suggestive ideas on what he saw as the Angevin 
Conquest. 
16. The Letters Qf John Qi Salisbury i, ed. C.N.L. Brooke et al. 
(London 1955), no. 102. van Caenegem, Royal Writs, 284, n. 2, 
331-2 associates the edict with the king's channel crossing in 
either 1156 or 1158. 
17. Glanvill, iv. 10 (ed. Hall 50). Commentary has concentrated on 
the relationship with Alexander Ill's decretal !, 3. 38. 19. M. 
Cheney, §HR 1vi (1941), 193-4 and J.W. Gray, ibid. lxvii (1952), 
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488, n. 4 differ on the degree of seisin required to qualify for 
life protection. 
18. See D.M. Stenton in Selden Soc. liii (1934), lix-Ixiii and 
Selden Soc. Ivi (1937), li-liii. 
